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Abstract
Unemployment and Migration in the cases of Sweden, Germany, Italy and
France
A trade union perspective
Migration into Europe has become one of the most heavily discussed topics. Right winged
populist forces are gaining support by linking migration to security and by treating mi-
gration as a threat to employment, wages and social standards in Europe. Have the trade
union positions towards migrants changed since the 2000s? If they have, in what sense
did they change? This thesis will firstly analyze the historical migration regimes of Swe-
den, Germany, Italy and France, and describe the current dynamics. Furthermore, this
thesis will present a comparative discussion of the confederations’ positions on the issue
of migration.
Key words: Migration, Trade Unions, Unemployment, Europe.
Resumo
Desemprego e Migrações nos casos da Suécia, Alemanha, Itália e França
Uma perspectiva sindical
As migrações para a Europa tornaram-se num dos temas mais discutidos na atualidade. As
forças da extrema direita populista estão recebendo mais apoio por conta da construção
de um discurso que relaciona migrações com as questões da segurança, tratando-as como
uma ameaça para o emprego, salários e standards sociais na Europa.
Há uma mudança nas respostas dos sindicatos sobre a migração desde 2000? Se há uma
mudança, em que sentido os posicionamentos mudaram? Esta dissertação analisará, pri-
meiro, os regimes migratórios da Suécia, Alemanha, Itália e França numa perspectiva
histórica. Posteriormente, apresentará uma análise comparativa dos posicionamentos das
Confederações sindicais dos quatro países sobre as dinâmicas migratórias.
Palavras-chave: Migração, Sindicatos, Desemprego, Europa.
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1 Introduction
Migration has been the number one political issue in Europe ever since the war in
Syria has caused a high number of people to seek refuge in the European Union. The vast
majority arrives by sea, coming into Italy, Malta and Greece first. Until the Balkan route
was closed last year, many refugees made their way from Turkey to Hungary, Austria,
and Slovenia by foot. Most migrants strive to reach the richer European countries that
still have more accessible asylum policies, namely Germany and Sweden. Trade unions are
a stakeholder in the discussion about migration and refugees in Europe. Their positions
and discourses shape politics and lead to political measures being adopted.
The central question of this thesis therefore is how the positions of trade unions towards
migrants and migrant workers have changed since the 2000s. And if they have changed,
how have they changed and in what respects. I develop a comparative analysis of four
Western European countries: Sweden, Germany, Italy and France. The historical develop-
ment of migration into these countries and the political dimensions will give the context
of the discussion on trade union positions. I ask if the trade unions of the four countries
of interest to this thesis have changed their positions towards migrants since in the 2000s.
This thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter will give a historical perspective
on migration into Europe. This chapter aims to contextualize the trade unions positions
that will be discussed in the second chapter. Firstly the guest worker and the colonial
regimes will be described in their general dynamics. Then the specific migration regimes
of the time will be presented for the four countries. The following section will center on
neoliberalism in Western Europe. The main economic changes will be briefly discussed and
then the neoliberal migration regime will be presented. Given that the institutions of the
European Union started to play a larger role in migration policies within the EU, several
sections will describe the characteristics of the Europeanization of the migration regime.
Subsequently each country’s di erent neoliberal migration regime is discussed. The cur-
rent situation is introduced by a short summary of the economic crisis that started in 2008.
The following items are about the current asylum-migration to Europe. After presenting
the fact and figures for the current migration into Europe, the main policy responses
on a European level will be gone into. The main events and policy decisions of Sweden,
Germany, Italy and France will be summarized. The last section of the first chapter con-
centrates on migration and the labor market. This will enable an in depth discussion of
the trade union positions in chapter two.
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The second chapter aims to highlight the trade union perspective on migration. I continue
to concentrate on the four countries Sweden, Germany, Italy and France. The chapter
starts by describing the Keynesian view of the labor market. His concepts had signifi-
cant impacts on the labor movements in Western Europe and on trade unions. The main
academic theories on the e ect of migration on the labor market are presented. Addi-
tionally the current debate on the e ects of the asylum-migration into Europe will be
re-narrated.The following section will go into the di erent trade unions that exist in Eu-
rope. The literature on the diverging labor movement traditions in Western Europe will
be reviewed. The subsequent items will go into the trade union traditions and industrial
relations of Sweden, Germany, Italy and France. The relationship between migration and
trade unions is discussed on the basis of the current literature on the topic. The remain-
ing sections will present an in depth analysis of the trade union positions in Sweden,
Germany, Italy and France towards migrants. After briefly recapping the trade union’s
positions during the fordist migration regime, I trace the changes in their positions to-
wards immigrants. I consider o cial positions as well as actions toward and with migrants.
While analyzing the trade unions of Sweden, Germany, Italy and France I concentrate
on certain trade union confederations. In Sweden the LO-Sweden will serve as the main
focus. The LO-Sweden has historically been the most powerful trade union and has had
the largest influence on migration issues. In Germany the DGB, the German trade union
confederation serves as a case study. While studying the changes that took place within
the DGB it is also necessary to take the two largest sectorial unions, the services union
Verdi and the metal workers union IG Metall into account. In Italy the CGIL will the be
the focus of the research. The CGIL has historically been the largest and most influential
trade union confederation in Italy. For France I chose to focus on the CGT. Equally the
CGT has been the largest trade union, with the most members and therefore with the
most influence.
In this thesis the terms migrant, immigrant, refugee and asylum seeker are frequently
used. While refugee refers to a person that has obtained the o cial status of a refugee
in a country, asylum seekers refers to a person that has submitted an asylum claim but
whose claim has not been confirmed yet. Illegalized and irregular migrants refer to mi-
grants without a residence or work permit. Migrant and immigrants is used synonymously,
meaning everyone that lives in a country where he/she is not born. Both the categories of
refugee and asylum seeker can be subsumed in the category of a migrant or immigrant.
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2 Migration in Europe: A historical Perspec-
tive
International migration is a dependent variable that only acquires meaning when it
meets the borders of destination states. This means that international migration is made
visible by the borders of the destination states. Within the destination states international
migration is defined by categories. The European member states classify migrants into
categories that then have di erent legal implications. The first di erence that European
member states undertake is the distinction between “voluntary” and “forced” migration.
“Forced” migration implies refugees while “voluntary” migration implies economic mi-
grants. In this context, Geddes (2017) rightly asks “Are migrants voluntary or forced if
they leave their countries because of unemployment or poverty?” (7). It becomes clear
that the distinction is made by the receiving countries in order to legitimize restrictions
(HESS et al., 2016).
European migration regimes 1 can be divided into a Fordist epoch and a neoliberal epoch.
I suggest “an epochal reading” (RYNER; CAFRUNY, 2016) of European migratory devel-
opments. It is therefore important to distinguish between the Fordist and the Neoliberal
finance- led epochs of European development. Three di erent phases of migration into
Europe can be distinguished from 1945 until now. The fist phase was from 1945 until
1973 and is characterized by the guest worker and colonial regimes. The dominant mode
of production was Fordism. The second phase, 1973 until the mid 1990s was characterized
by “zero migration” policies and by neoliberal restructuring. Mine workers and factory
workers experienced mass dismissals which also a ected guest workers. The fall of the
Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union meant a rise of refugees during this
phase. The third phase, starting from the mid until the end of the 1990s onwards, was
marked by a post- guest worker regime This phase is marked by the opening up of new
labor frontiers in Central and Eastern Europe. Poland, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and
the Baltic states served as a labor reserve for Western and Southern European countries.
Additionally these countries served as transit countries for migrants coming from outside
of Europe (CASTLES, 2014). The dominant mode of production during the second and
third phase was postfordistic/neoliberal. Currently this last migration regime is in crisis.
1 In this context migration regime signifys the set of rules and practices that have developed historically
in a country or a region (i.e.: the European Union). A country’s migration regime is usually not the
outcome of consistent planning It is rather a mix of implicit cenceptual frames. „The notion of a
migration regime allows room for gaps, ambiguities and outirght strains: the life of a regime is the
14
The following sections will describe the main dynamics of the three phases of migrant
regimes in Europe. I will focus on the four countries of interest to this thesis: Italy,
France, Germany and Sweden. While each country has its own historical features there
are overarching trends on a European level. As Geddes (2017) puts it: “The story of mi-
gration in Europe is not a story of national exceptionalism. There are close ties between
the di erent countries due to European integration”(GEDDES; SCHOLTEN, 2017, 17).
The last subchapter of this chapter will give a preview of the current situation.The his-
torical embeddedness of migration in Europe and in the countries of interest in this thesis
is important in order to subsequently analyze trade unions responses.
2.1 The guest-worker and colonial migration regimes in Europe
The Fordist epoch, which starts in Europe by the end of World War II, is charac-
terized by the European common market and the international Bretton Woods System.
The Fordist regulation emerged in the USA in the 1930s and became generalized after
1945. The productive system was based on the integration of mass production and mass
consumption through social wages and productivity growth. Technological innovation and
collective agreements led to welfare expansion and the distribution of productivity gains.
US hegemony was another important feature, represented by the gold standard, meaning
that the USA provided stability and liquidity. This period is characterized by what Gram-
sci calls integral hegemony: “highly stable relations characterized by a well-developed sense
of common purpose and lack of overt antagonism”(CAFRUNY; RYNER, 2007, 143).
Migration was structured by either a guest-worker program or by colonial ties. Both
regimes have common features and many countries had a mixture of both. Immigration
in Western Europe in the 1950s and 60s was key to economic reconstruction (GEDDES;
SCHOLTEN, 2017). Labor immigration peaked in the 1960s. However the notion of the
guest worker meant that the migrants were seen as being temporary. The intention was
to have temporary migrant laborers come to the host country and then leave again. This
was obviously an illusion. During the Fordist epoch political leaders had the image of
migration being a “water faucet that can be turned on and o  at will“ (CASTLES, 2005).
Many migrants chose to stay in the country that recruited them as workers. Even after
the o cial end of the guest worker programs, migration did not cease to happen. Family
reunion started being the main port of entrance into Western Europe.
The migrant workers came mostly from the European periphery to Western Europe and
from the (former) colonies to the colonial states. There were, however, also other forms of
migration even though these were not dominant. European refugees at the end of World
War II and returning refugees from Poland to the Federal Republic of Germany repre-
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sented a relevant form of migration. Migrants also returned to their home countries after
they gained independence from European colonial states, as was the case for Algerians
living in France and then returning to Algeria (CASTLES, 2014).
2.1.1 The guest worker regime in Sweden
Sweden developed from a foremost emigration country to a country of immigration
after 1945. As Sweden was relatively untouched by the destruction of the Second World
War, the Swedish industry experienced a boom in the early years right after the end of
the war. Therefore the Swedish labor market was in need of additional laborers early on.
Sweden made use of the Nordic labor with many workers coming from Denmark, Norway
and Finland. The Swedish government abolished work permits as early as 1943 and spe-
cial treatment for laborers from these Nordic countries was implemented in 1954. This
had the e ect that labor immigration from other countries than the mentioned Nordic
countries remained marginal until the 1960s. This also meant that immigration to Sweden
was practically free until the end of the 1960s (HARZIG, 1999).
Formalities of immigration only took a day or two. The immigration regime in Sweden
was built upon a pact between labor and capital. In the beginning of the guest worker
period immigration issues were decided by local unions and employers that compromised
on how much labor the local economy was in need of. This specific welfare system ef-
fectively blocked the use of migration as a vehicle for wage depreciation and as a guar-
antee for equal rights and as a “bullwork against discrimination and racial harassment”
(SCHIERUP; ÅLUND, 2011, 48). Only during the 1960s did immigration became a con-
cern of the centralized government, together with labor market relations (ROSENBERG,
1995).
During the guest-worker period migrant workers predominantly came from Finland. At
the height of the labor-recruitment period in 1970 40 000 of the 74 000 labor migrants
were Finish (HARZIG, 1999). Even though most immigrants were Finish, immigration
from other, especially Southern European countries increased during the 1960s. This led
to a debate on social and economic problems resulting from migration and exploitative
working conditions for these labor migrants. The first restrictions on labor immigration
were put in place in 1966, which introduced a mandatory labor permit. In order to obtain
a labor permit it was necessary for the worker to possess a job contract, to prove that ad-
equate housing was available and to have the consent of the local trade union. The trade
union usually assessed if the local labor force was exhausted or not. It thus became more
di cult for non-Nordic labor migrants to enter Sweden legally. Labor migrants were to
be o cially recruited by the Swedish government or the Swedish Labor Market Authority
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(AMS) (ROSENBERG, 1995).
The fundamentals of the Swedish immigration and also integration policies were for-
mulated in the following years and its principles are still relevant to this day. In 1975 a
progressive reform of policies on immigration and integration were passed through par-
liament. The slogan of equality, freedom of choice and partnership, based on the slogan of
the French revolution egalité, liberté, fraternité, was the principle of the new laws. They
gave access to almost all the established rights of “civil, political and social citizenship,
even for immigrant non-citizens” (SCHIERUP; ÅLUND, 2011, 48).
As in other Western European countries, o cial labor migration recruitment ended in
1972. The main form of immigration from then on was based on family reunification and
asylum. As Schierrup (2011) puts it: “The Swedish model appeared to be one of the most
balanced political attempts to merge a liberal-universalist framework of citizenship with
particular identity claims” (SCHIERUP; ÅLUND, 2011, 49).
2.1.2 The guest worker regime in Germany
Migration in Germany after the end of the Second World War was marked by a
highly organized guest worker system. Guest workers were, however, not the only form
of migration into the Federal Republic of Germany. Before Germany o cially started re-
cruiting foreign workers, the question of refugees was in the focus of the debate about
migrants. Refugees from Eastern Europe who had collaborated with the Nazis and for-
mer forced laborers as well as former prisoners of concentration camps were migrants
in search of a place to stay. After the Second World War an estimated 11 million peo-
ple were considered Displaced Persons in Europe. Between 1949 and 1961 an estimated
3,8 million people migrated from Eastern to Western Germany (BOJADéIJEV, 2008, 98).
The German government o cially started recruiting foreign laborers in 1950. The Federal
Labor O ce (BfA) was set up in order to recruit workers in Mediterranean countries. The
new fordist methods of production (see chapter 2.1.) required large numbers of low skilled
workers. The workers were brought to Germany in groups and the employer then provided
accommodation. Recruitment, working conditions and social security were regulated by
bilateral agreements with the sending countries (CASTLES, 2014).
Companies started recruiting workers by themselves before the appropriate institutions
were created by the government. The stone pit industry in Hannover had employed sev-
eral Algerian workers in 1955 and dismissed them after they protested against their poor
salaries. The first bilateral agreement was signed between Germany and Italy in 1954.
However only 57% of the Italian guest workers passed through the o cial recruitment
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procedures to come to Germany. 43% found other ways to immediately work in Germany.
In the subsequent years the German government signed agreements with Spain, Greece,
Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia. The governments of the sending coun-
tries had a large interest in controlling who was able to leave their country. The Franco
regime in Spain, for example, wanted to impede regime critics and highly skilled workers
to leave. The Federal Republic of Germany wanted to hinder communists from entering
the country (BOJADéIJEV, 2008).
Women represented a relevant part of the guest worker labor force. They were especially
important for textiles and clothing as well as for electrical goods and other manufactur-
ing sectors. The amount of female guest workers was 30% by 1970. Of this group about
a third was unmarried which questions the image of migrant women only being the wife
of the male guest worker. Female guest workers worked and lived separately from their
male counterparts. Especially migrant women were expected to leave Germany after a
short period of time to marry and start a family in their home country. However, espe-
cially women were less likely to go back to their country than male guest workers were
(BOJADéIJEV, 2008, 104).
The general idea of having guest workers was that these workers would leave as soon
as the employers didn’t need them anymore. However it was impossible to prevent family
reunion and permanent settlement. “The Federal Republic of Germany took the system
the furthest, but its central element – the legal distinction between the status of citizen
and of foreigner as a criterion for determining political and social rights – was to be found
throughout Europe” (CASTLES, 2014, 104).
2.1.3 The guest worker regime in Italy: postwar migration
Italy, similarly to other countries of Southern Europe served as a labor supplier for
Western European countries. It was therefore an outmigration-country and only became
a country of immigration in the 1980s. Internal migration, however, was a main economic
driver for the country after WWII. The underdeveloped south was therefore crucial for
the economic take o  of the Northern triangle between Milan, Turin and Genoa. The
character of this internal migration was similar to the foreign worker movements in the
Western European countries (CASTLES, 2014).
The construction industry (especially steel-, engine-, and vehicle production) became the
dominant industries for Northern Italy. This prompted migration from the South of Italy
towards the North that shared many of the same characteristics and challenges that were
posed by southern Italian migration to Northern Europe. Some authors (SPARSCHUH,
2014) argue in this direction saying that internal Italian migration shares many or the
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same characteristics as migration from Italy to central and Northern Europe. However,
there was one major di erence: Southern Italians were citizens in Northern Italy while
they were non-citizens in central and Northern Europe, such as Germany.
National ties within Italy were feeble after 1945. The recent Italian unification, in 1861
and the harsh di erences between the prosperous north and the impoverished south led
to diverging class structures, political systems and cultural realities between the regions.
Some even go so far as to argue that di erent societies existed within Italy. The vast
majority of migrants came form the region south of Rome consisting of Abruzzi, Molise,
Campania, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria and the two main islands Sardinia and Sicily.
They were typically between twenty and forty years old and mainly male. Their level of
education was considerably lower than that of the population of the receiving cities and
regions. Additionally, before the television in Italy “nationalized” (SPARSCHUH, 2014)
the Italian language, considerable language di erences existed between the North and the
South. The migrants were confronted with prejudices and a heated public debated about
the higher rate of criminality and their deviant political orientation.
Migration in Italy was highly regulated. A law, dating back to the fascist regime, was
still in place until 1961. It restricted the possibility to migrate into larger cities and even
enabled expulsions of therefore illegalized migrants. This leggi contro l’urbanesimo ille-
galized migrants without an employment and housing and therefore also curtailed their
political and social rights. Labor migrants were given the least qualified and hardest jobs.
Another important feature of the migration regime within Italy was the demand in do-
mestic labor and personal services. Migration from the South to the North of Italy and
from rural to urban areas provided middle and upper class families with domestic workers.
“For most of the twentieth century generic domestic service – as well as a variety of more
specialized jobs like cook, laundry-maker and nanny – was the Italian female equivalent
of the assembly line” (COLOMBO; SCIORTINO, 2004, 117).
Similar to labor migration to Northern Europe, the migration of laborers from the South
to the North of Italy was followed by a phase of family reunification. Even though these
workers were also seen as “guest workers” and therefore temporary, in the end they stayed
in the Northern regions.
2.1.4 The guest worker regime in France: (post) colonial ties
After the end of the Second World War France was, similar to other countries of
Western Europe, faced with labor shortages. This, paired with low birth rates led the
French government to promote migration as a solution. Migration to France was there-
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fore a mixture of the e ect of colonial ties and of explicit migrant labor recruitment and
illegalized migration.
Due to colonial ties to Northern Africa, citizens of those countries were not considered as
migrants and their entry and exit of France was not controlled. Legally they enjoyed the
same rights as French citizens. After the colonies gained independence this relationship
started to change. The French government enacted several legislations in order to limit
immigration from the former colonies. A quota for Algerian citizens was even defined.
This was ine ective and France experienced large-scale spontaneous immigration from
former colonies in the Maghreb, from Algeria, Morocco and Tunesia. Many of these immi-
grants entered France illegally and stayed in an illegalized situation until they were either
legalized through an employment or through the general legalization wave of the French
government in 1960 (ABDALLAH, 2000).
In order to organize the recruitment of workers from Southern Europe the French gov-
ernment established the O ce National d’Immigration (ONI). The ONI coordinated the
employment of 150 000 seasonal workers from Spain. However the ONI was not able to
su ciently recruit the number of workers that the French economy was in need of. Com-
panies had to undergo a complicated beaurocratic process to recruit workers through the
ONI so that most preferred to find other ways to counter their labor shortages. There-
fore companies recruited workers directly in Southern Europe and Northern Africa and
regularized them later on through the ONI (HANSEN, 2003).
2.2 The neoliberal migration regimes in Europe
The neoliberal migration regime is marked by the economic changes of the period.
There were considerable shifts in the economic policies in Europe. I will therefore firstly go
into the main economic characteristics of the period before describing the main features
of migration during the neoliberal regime. Both phases of the migration regime, the zero
migration doctrine and the post-guest worker regime apply to the four countries Sweden,
Germany, Italy and France.
2.2.1 Neoliberalism in Europe
By the end of the 1960s Fordism began to experience serious strains. Lower pro-
ductivity led to a decrease in the rate of profit. The recovery of the crisis of the 1970s in
Europe was based on export-oriented strategies. Especially Germany specialized in high-
value-added manufactured goods. Monetarism therefore enjoyed high ideological esteem.
The neoliberal restructuring of Europe of the 1980s and 1990s helped institutionalize a
finance- led epoch of capitalism. Production and consumption were integrated by the ex-
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tension of debt.
On an ideological level neoliberalism was prepared by the Société du Mont-Pélerin in
the 1940s. In the 1970s the University of Chicago served as the academic and ideological
hub for neoliberalism. By the end of the 1970s neoliberal economic principles had been
adopted and were being promoted by international organizations such as the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Developement (OECD) and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). With the election of Ronald Reagan in the USA and Margret Thatcher
in the United Kingdom neoliberal politics of deregulation and liberalizations were being
implemented in two leading economies of the world (CROUCH, 2011).
Neoliberalism was accompanied by various contradictions. One of them was the need
to invest in ever riskier segments of the market in order to produce growth, such as the
real estate in Southern and Eastern Europe. Interest bearing capital (meaning fictitious
capital and derivatives) grew faster than the industrial capital. This can be seen as one
of the major contradictions that led to the current economic crisis. In Germany private
loans from banks and other financial institutions (as percentage of GDP) rose from 39%
in 1960 to 72% in 1973 to 105% in 2007. Therefore the volume of credit grew faster than
the GDP. These figures and tendencies can be translated to a global level. In 1990 global
financial assets were equivalent to 263% of the global domestic product, in 2007 they were
355% (DEMIROVI∆, 2013).
Those having a social interest in neoliberal restructuring were (and are) transnational
businesses connected to transatlantic circuits of capital accumulation. Neoliberalism is
characterized by minimal hegemony: “Neoliberal ideology. . . still cements capitalist ruling
classes together in an organic alliance and, although institutional arrangements increas-
ingly fail to provide material concessions consistent with civil societal norms, there is
not a su ciently strong counter-movement to challenge this order on the ‘ethico-political’
level” (CAFRUNY; RYNER, 2007, 144). Additionally average real wages have stagnated
in all of the Global North since the 1990s. This has been accompanied by an increase
in inequality. The stagnation in real wages was in part compensated by debts of wage
earners. These debts often covered day to day expenses such as housing, university fees,
cars and medical bills. They have often replaced social state initiatives. Furthermore the
income disparity among wage-earners increased significantly. While the real wages of the
poorer wage-earners has dropped and their lives have become more precarious, the real
wages of the richer wage-earners have actually increased (CANDEIAS, 2004).
Another characteristic of the neoliberal epoch is the financialization of companies. An
increasing share of the profits industrial and trading companies earn is by speculation
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on the financial markets. These speculations led to a re-distribution of profits within the
capitalist class itself. This process has been increasingly organized by investment bank
and private equity funds that have therefore gained significance from the 1980s onwards.
A consequence of this process has been that companies have concentrated more on their
core business, which has led to a fragmentation of value chains and a reduction of produc-
tion. ”Commodities are then produced by contract manufacturers frequently operating
from low-wage countries” (DEMIROVI∆, 2013). Also the internationalization of capital
and the relocation of productive capital to the global south (so called "o shoring") has
increased.
2.2.2 The neoliberal migration regime in Europe
After the oil crisis in 1973 the guest worker programs in European countries came
to an end. Migration policies suddenly changed and given the rise in unemployment, Eu-
ropean countries adopted zero immigration policies. This meant that the main legal route
for migration was through family reunification.
Another shift in migration policies took place at the end of the 1990s in Europe. There was
a slow tendency to abandon the “zero migration” goal and to acknowledge an economic
and demographic need of migrants 2. Additionally undocumented migration was perceived
as a security threat and therefore policy makers decided to open up more legal routes for
migrants instead. Schemes for temporary or seasonal workers were set up in Germany,
Sweden and Italy (CASTLES, 2006). The Forschungsgruppe Staatsprojekt Europa (2014)
argue that migration politics in Europe starting from the 1990s onwards, were marked by
a Europeanization of these politics and, similar to the arguments made by Castles (CAS-
TLES, 2005), by a slow replacement of policies that aimed at sealing o  the European
continent from migrants. There was a recruitment of highly skilled workers paired with
the quasi exploitation of illegalized immigrants. The need for labor in certain sectors led
to increased and more flexible migration. One consequence was also the redistribution of
domestic work towards migrant women who often worked (and still continue to work) in
precarious and illegalized situations (BUCKEL et al., 2014).
On a European level, the European Commission o cially abandoned its “zero migra-
tion”3 goal in 2000. The reasoning was that Europe was in need of migration due to
demographics and that the social system will not be able to sustain itself without a con-
trolled influx of migration. This change towards a post-guest worker regime risked pro-
voking negative reactions from the European public. Therefore the European Commission
2 The "zero migration policy" applies mainly to immigrants from outside of the European Union. The
internal migration within the European Union was facilitated by the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty
of Amsterdam.
3 Here I refer to immigrants from outside of the European Union.
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was keen on accentuating a stern stance towards illegal migration (BUCKEL et al., 2014).
An important expression of the shift in migration policies of the European Commission
towards a system of managed migration was the proposal of the Blue Card in 2007. The
European Commission wanted to enable and harmonize the immigration of highly skilled
workers in the European Union. The Commission argued that migration is the solution to
the problem of demography in Europe and to the problem of a shortage of labor in certain
skilled sectors. The Blue Card meant to enable the supply of qualified workers for the sec-
tors and regions that needed them. Additionally, the European Union was to become more
competitive in the recruitment of workers. This initiative would have also meant a begin-
ning Europeanization of the still strongly national labor markets. Furthermore the gaps in
qualified labor could be solved without investing in education and vocational training and
therefore without having to spend public funds. However, this initiative proved to be too
ambitious and in the end the European Council, therefore the member states, softened
the most important parts of the legislation, leaving the organization of the recruitment of
highly skilled workers in the competence of the member states. The European IT industry
had been especially keen on the Blue Card. Labor Unions, as well as conservative forces
were skeptical. In the end the managed migration that was proposed by the Commission
through the Blue Card did not succeed. However, it intiated a policy direction for the
member states towards a managed migration that took on di erent forms on the member
states (GEORGI et al., 2014).
The accession of several Eastern European countries in 2004 additionally changed the
situation of many guest workers in Western Europe. Several countries, such as Germany
and Sweden introduced a waiting period for workers from the new member states (CAS-
TLES, 2006).
The introduction of the Dublin II decree in 2003 marked an essential point in the Eu-
ropeanization of migration politics. The Dublin II decree introduced common rules for
the Asylum system. The Dublin Regulation aims to rapidly determine the Member State
responsible for an asylum claim and provides for the transfer of an asylum seeker to that
Member State. Usually, the responsible Member State is the state through which the asy-
lum seeker first entered the EU. This means that the state in which the migrant person
first sets foot on European territory is responsible for his or her asylum claim. Migrants
can therefore not freely choose which country they want to claim asylum in. Countries of
the European south have especially been under increased pressure to secure their external
borders. Greece, Italy and Malta are particulary a ected by the Dublin regulation since
many migrants pass through these three countries in order to reach Europe (MEYER-
HÖFER et al., 2014).
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In reaction to the Dublin regulations southern European states were at the forefront of
initiatives to externalize the responsibility of securing their borders to northern African
states. Bilateral agreements were meant to hinder migrants from crossing the Mediter-
ranean sea. Italy was one of the first Southern European states to reach a deal with a
Northern African state – Libya. The first o cial deal was signed by both countries in
2000 stressed the increased collaboration in the control of illegal migration. Italy pro-
vided Libya with surveillance technologies, built camps for illegalized immigrations and
financed and operationalized deportation flights from Italy to Libya and from Libya to
other states. In the following ten years several other similar accords were signed between
these two countries, further enhancing cooperation. Mixed border control teams surveilled
the sea and Italian border control agents trained their Libyan counterparts on how to hin-
der migrants form leaving the Libyan coast. These deals can be seen as blueprints for the
politics of the European Union when externalizing its borders (PICHL; VESTER, 2014).
2.2.2.1 The securitization of migration and the obligations of migrants
Another important characteristic of the neoliberal migration regime in Europe
is the securitization4 of migration and a shift in the discursive perception of migration.
Additionally the debate about migration in Europe has been increasingly linked to the
welfare state and to the concept of citizenship. These two characteristics of the neoliberal
migration regime will be described and analyzed in this section.
The securitization of migration (HUYSMANS, 2000) implies that asylum seekers and
immigrants are portrayed as a challenge to the protection of national identity and welfare
provisions. Migration is seen as a force which endangers the good life in western Euro-
pean countries. “EU policies support, often indirectly, expressions of welfare chauvinism
and the idea of cultural hegemony as stabilizing factor “ (HUYSMANS, 2000, 753). Ad-
ditionally there is a confusion of immigration and asylum. Asylum has been increasingly
politicized as an alternative route for economic immigration into the EU. This explains,
so Jef Huysmans, why asylum is so easily connected to illegal immigration. An example
of this dynamic is the creation of the EURODAC fingerprint database for asylum seekers.
The creation of the EURODAC was justified by the “rise in illegal immigration”. “ The
development of security discourses and policies in the area of migration is often presented
as an inevitable policy response to the challenges for public order and domestic stability of
the increases in the number of (illegal) immigrants and asylum seekers. . . The policy is an
instrument to protect the state, its society and the internal market against the dangers re-
lated to an invasion of (illegal) immigrants and asylum seekers” (HUYSMANS, 2000, 757).
4 The securitization of migration means that asylum seekers and immigrants are perceived as a threat
to the protection of national identity and welfare provisions.
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The securitization of migration has fostered racism and xenophobia by linking asylum-
seekers and migrants to negative things. “Migration has become a meta issue, that is, a
phenomenon that can be referred to as the cause of many problems” (HUYSMANS, 2000,
761). The discourse in integration, which is linked to to the securitization of migration, has
directly and indirectly confirmed a nationalist desire for a culturally homogenous society.
It contains the notion that the di erent life style and culture of migrants are potentially
destabilizing to the social formation. Migrants are expected to opt for the “hosting” soci-
ety. “The state is asserting its role as protector of national identity and social cohesion.
One of the ways it seeks to achieve these objectives is through demonstrating its ability
to control and manage migrations and diversity” (KOFMAN, 2005, 455).
Migration has started to feature prominently in the struggle over the welfare state. Given
that the welfare state is under increased pressure through neoliberal forces, a form of wel-
fare chauvinism (HUYSMANS, 2000) has emerged. Immigrants and asylum-seekers are
not only rivals but illegitimate recipients of socio-economic rights. The use of metaphors
such as “flood” or “invasion” of asylum-seekers by some media outlets confirms these
xenophobic tendencies. “In the political spectacle these metaphors help to dramatize the
socio-economic problematic of the welfare state by framing it in a security discourse: ex-
periences of economic and social uncertainty are translated into opposition to and fear of
immigrants and asylum seekers” (HUYSMANS, 2000, 769).
There was a widening gap between the citizens and the disruptive outsides. Here, es-
pecially the figure of the asylum seeker served as the outsider. “A more contractual model
of citizenship with an emphasis on obligations” started to emerge (KOFMAN, 2005, 455).
Considering asylum seekers and immigrants the term “tipping point” started to be used
to refer to unacceptable levels of rapid immigration. The term “threshold of tolerance”
was introduced into the discourse on migration in European states. “The danger of the
application of such a quantified level of tolerance was not so much in its formulation but
in the way that it allowed for the manipulation of ideas. One is able to reject the foreigner
in the name of science” (KOFMAN, 2005, 460).
Another feature of the discourse about migration in Europe were and are the imposi-
tion of conditions for the access to citizenship and for the access to social services. This
involves problematizing the cultures of “other” ethnic groups – especially those of immi-
grants and asylum seekers who are seen as incompatible with the “normal” population.
“Women as border guards of cultural di erence and reproducers of the migrant popula-
tion, now and in the future, serve to demonstrate the backwardness and maintenance of
traditions” (KOFMAN, 2005, 461). This explains the specific programs geared towards
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migrant women (such as language classes) who are supposedly especially oppressed by
the patriarchal structures of their cultural context.
2.2.3 The neoliberal migration regime in Sweden
Sweden is often celebrated as the most progressive and immigrant friendly country
of the world. The World Bank states that Sweden provides the most favorable conditions
for migrants in Europe (World Bank, 2017).
O cial labor recruitment was stopped in 1972. However, even though labor migration
o cially came to an end, immigration to Sweden did not cease to exist. The main form
of immigration was then organized through family reunion. Restrictive measures were
introduced concerning labor migration to Sweden. Policies towards refugees on the other
hand were notable for their generosity.
As a result the number of asylum-seekers increased. During the 1980s most refugees
came from coup-countries in Latin America, Turkey, Lebanon, Iran and Iraq. During the
1990s asylum seekers came mainly form the post Soviet Union countries and from former
Yugoslavia. The 2000s have seen intense family reunifications from Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Kosovo and refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq, especially after the US invasion. By
the mid-1990s, over 10% of Sweden’s inhabitants were foreign-born, and 13% were either
foreign-born or Swedish-born with two foreign-born parents (Eger, 2010). Currently Swe-
den, out of all the countries of the Global North, has the largest population of recent
“foreign background”. “Indeed taking together people of foreign origin and second –gen-
eration immigrants, people from a foreign background account for over 20% of Sweden’s
total population; of these, more than half are from non-European backgrounds (BON-
FANTI, 2014, 379).
1975 presented an important marking point for migration politics after the end of the
o cial labor recruitment programs. A number of progressive laws on immigration were
passed with a universalist conception of citizenship that implied a vision of social citi-
zenship and a multicultural view of the nation. The policy guaranteed access to almost
all established rights of civil, political and social citizenship for immigrants (BONFANTI,
2014). “ The Swedish model appeared to be one of the most balanced political attempts
to merge a liberal-universalist framework of citizenship with particular identity claims”
(SCHIERUP; ÅLUND, 2011, 48).
However, this specific Swedish model was also charged with contradictions. The 1980s
saw a general rise in unemployment and therefore also a rise in unemployment of the
immigration population. The Swedish society witnessed a rise in racism and xenopho-
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bia. Members of violent Nazi grassroots movements burned down refugee caps across the
country and a populist party, the New Democracy, won seats in the parliament in 1991
due to their harsh anti-immigration rhetoric (SCHIERUP; ÅLUND, 2011).
As an answer to these political upheavals, a broad coalition of moderate left and right
forces joined together to agree on a new integration policy in 1997. This new integration
policy targeted the entire population and was intended to create a new Swedish iden-
tity based on shared democratic values. “. . . there was an obvious convergence with the
neoliberal turn in Swedish politics in general, in which the ruling ‘third way’ Social Demo-
cratic party elite is the driving force. The merging integration policy with new policies
for economic growth and social inclusion through business friendly policies is evident in
a range of public reports. The buzzwords of the refurbished policies for integration are
‘lifelong learning’, ‘employability’ and ‘ethnic entrepreneurship’” (SCHIERUP; ÅLUND,
2011, 49).The focus shifted from “equality of outcome” to “equal opportunities”.
This has caused a growing number of migrants and minority ethnic Swedes to have been
pushed from the center to the periphery of the welfare system and into a degraded in-
formal sector. Youth unemployment among those with immigrant background has risen
considerably and employment conditions for those in precarious labor relations has dete-
riorated. Poverty is heavily concentrated in migrant and minority ethnic families in the
major big cities. Satellite towns have emerged into stigmatized territories with a reputa-
tion for social problems. These suburban areas have become hotspots for urban unrest
(SCHIERUP; ÅLUND, 2011).
Sweden joined the Schengen area5 in 2001 leading to increased migration from other
EU countries. A new law was introduced in 2008 that was called a law on “ labour im-
migration”. This law represents a new form of labor migration management in Sweden.
It was introduced by the center right government with support from the Greens, and
was primarily aimed at expanding labor immigration. It identified employers as being
best suited to understand their own recruitment needs and it transferred the authority
for processing cases involving resident and work permits from the Swedish public labor
market authorities to the Swedish Migration Board. This additionally represents the un-
dermining of trade unions’ influence on labor migration issues. The residence permit is
linked to the duration of the employment contract and is limited to certain sectors of
the labor market. After 4 years the migrant can apply for full citizenship. The paradigm
of managed migration is clearly represented in this labor reform. “The Swedish reform
5 The Schengen area means an area comprising of European states that mostly functions as a single
country for international travel purposes, with a common visa policy. States in the Schengen Area
have eliminated border controls with other Schengen members and strengthened border controls with
non-Schengen countries.
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mainly reflects the interests of employer organisations” (BONFANTI, 2014, 377). This
reform additionally deepened the distinction between people who need Sweden, meaning
asylum seekers, and the people Sweden needs, meaning labor migrants.
2.2.4 The neoliberal migration regime in Germany
In spite of the o cial end of the guest worker programs, migration continued to
rise in Germany in the 1970s. One of the reasons for this was the intensified family re-
unification that started after 1973. The government and leading politicians promoted the
discourse about “zero migration” which also had legal implications. The German govern-
ment pushed for the willingness of guest workers to return. Bonuses were o ered for those
who chose to return to their country of origin. However, this implied that the former
guest workers had to renounce their pension rights that they had gained during their
time working in Germany. In the end the bonus wasn’t very successful meaning that only
those who had already planned to leave Germany accepted the 10 000 DM o ered by
the government. Additionally, family reunion became increasingly di cult in the 1980s.
The minimum age for children that had the right to enter the country through family
reunification was reduced several times (BOJADéIJEV, 2008).
Another characteristic of the neoliberal migration regime in Germany was the rise in
asylum-migration. Given that the immigration route of the guest worker program was
pretty much closed o  and that family reunification became increasingly di cult, more
and more migrants chose to opt for asylum as a means of entering the country legally.
In the years between 1984 and 1992 the number of asylum seekers in Germany was 440
000. However at the same time less and less asylum applicants were granted the right to
asylum. The countries of origin of asylum seekers also changed over time. Until the mid
1980s this group consisted mainly of nationals from African and Asian countries and from
Turkey while the majority of asylum seekers came from Eastern Europe in the 1990s. The
collapse of the Soviet Union, the conflicts in Yugoslavia, Iraq and in Turkey led to an
increase of asylum seekers from these regions as well (BOJADéIJEV, 2008).
On a discursive level, the di erence between “illegitimate” economic refuge and “legiti-
mate” political refuge was being made. Especially tabloid newspapers agitated against the
“abuse” of the social system by migrants. The heated debate about migration climaxed
during a wave of violence towards immigrants in Germany in the 1990s. In September
1991 a racist mob lit up accommodation facilities for asylum seekers in the town of Hoy-
erswerda. In the following two weeks similar racist crimes were reported in over a dozen
German towns and villages. In winter 1992 three migrants burnt to death because two
teenagers set their house on fire. Another housing for asylum seekers was burnt down
by a mob that rampaged through the city of Rostock-Lichtenhagen. This is the reason
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why the coalition government between the Social democracy and the Green Party in 1998
announced the struggle against racism as their priority. This government marked the end
of the “zero” migration policy and presents a shift towards managed migration (KAN-
NANKULAM, 2014). The main point of managed migration is the acknowledgement that
migration cannot be turned on and o  and that it is therefore necessary to control it.
Furthermore Germany wanted to start attracting highly skilled workers. The red-green
government started a debate about a possible green card system similar to the one in the
USA. In the end a new immigration bill entered into force in 2005 (BOJADéIJEV, 2008).
One of the main points of this new piece of legislation was the simplification for highly
qualified workers to gain permanent residence. Additionally foreign students at Germany
universities had the possibility of looking for a job in Germany during the time period
of one year after they graduated (FAZ, 2004). Both measures point towards a German
version of managed migration.
However, even before a system of managed migration was o cially implemented, im-
migration was a reality and was part of the German labor market. Germany introduced a
number of foreign worker programs, the largest being the foreign workers program of 1991
that allowed migrants from central and eastern European countries to work for up to three
months in catering, building and agriculture. Another such program is the foreign “con-
tract workers”. This meant a transnational subcontract arrangement, allowing workers to
be employed by a company of their home country but to work in i.e. Germany. It implied
lower wages and social costs for those receiving the labor in Germany. Stephan Castles
(2006) writes: “More than 200 000 employees from other EU countries were working on
German construction sites in 1999” (CASTLES, 2006, 751). Therefore the German model
of long-term employment was being undermined in these specific sectors. “The decline
of the long term employment model and its replacement with contract workers thus had
negative e ects on social integration and intergroup relations” (CASTLES, 2006, 751).
Another important aspect of the neoliberal migration regime in Germany, especially of
the managed migration regime beginning in the 2000s, was the discursive link between
migration and terrorism. After the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center in
the United States, this became an important mode to legitimize restrictions on, especially,
asylum migration. The new migration bill 2005 makes specific reference to terrorism, mak-
ing the deportation of individuals deemed “dangerous” easier and quicker (FAZ, 2004).
2.2.5 The neoliberal migration regime in Italy
International immigration to Italy became an issue later than in Sweden, France
and Germany. Being primarily a country of emigration and internal immigration, the mo-
ment where Italy became a country of international immigration is an important marking
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point. The Italian neoliberal migration regime is characterized by illegalized migrants, a
strong securitization of migration and then eventually a turn towards a labor migration
orientation of migration policies.
The first time more immigrants came to Italy and than emigrants leaving the country
was in the mid 1970s. In Italy, as in other Southern European countries, immigration
arrived in a more contradictory post-Fordist era than in the Northern European states
(COLOMBO; SCIORTINO, 2004).
One of the first sectors to experience increased immigration from abroad, and not from
within Italy was the sector of domestic services and labor. Towards the end of the 1960s
and early 1970s, live-in maids from former Italian colonies were a phenomenon even ac-
knowledged and discussed by the press. Active recruitment was managed by the Catholic
Church through its missionary network in the beginning. Women were therefore the ma-
jority of the foreign residents in the years between 1970 and 1980s. The first restrictive
laws passed on immigration in Italy also targeted this group of foreign laborers. In 1972
the Ministry of Labor restricted foreign domestic work to live-in contracts, thus denying
foreign women the more appealing option of hourly paid work. Additionally a change in
employer would have entailed returning to the sending country for at least three years.
These regulations produced widespread undocumented work and migrants in the sector.
Foreign domestic workers were therefore an important pillar of the Italian welfare regime
and enjoyed a faire degree of tolerance. They were subject to numerous amnesty programs
and regularizations (COLOMBO; SCIORTINO, 2004).
The increase in international immigrants in Italy coincided with the transition of the
domestic economy of the country. The domestic economy transformed from an industrial
to a service society. This coincided with an increase in poverty, turning it into one the
countries with the highest inequalities in the European continent. The indice of poverty
increased from 8,3 % to 14,4% between 1980 and 1989. Therefore the rise in immigration
took place at the same time as many Italians were su ering some degree of degradation
of their living standards. Additionally, traditional structures of solidarity, such as trade
unions, and the country’s rich leftist culture started to give way to more conservative ide-
ologies and consumerist ways of life. In the 1980s the large political forces of the country,
the Christian Democratic Party and the Socialist Party ceased to be the stronghold they
once were. Silvio Berlusconi’s party Forza Italia started gaining strength (FALCI, 2011).
Migration to Italy has been marked by a large proportion of illegalized immigrants. Con-
servative estimates mention that about 500 000 to 700 000 illegalized people lived in
Italy in 2011. In the last 30 years being illegal at some point was part of the migra-
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tory process to Italy. Frequent amnesties and mass regularizations made being illegal
a temporary status for most migrants (FALCI, 2011). “Six amnsties in 22 years speak
of a labor market that in the end has always forced politicians to recognize the de facto
inclusion of unauthorized immigrants in the economic system” (AMBROSINI, 2013, 192).
The first important law concerning immigration was the Martelli Law of 1989. For the
first time this law regulated the status of refugees in the country and that of migrants
who resided in Italy but did not possess a working contract. A ministry for Immigration
was even created due to the Martelli Law. It was later incorporated into the Ministry of
Social A airs. The 1990s were marked by a series of regulations of illegalized migrants.
This meant a turning point in migration policies in Italy: “the provision of this integral
law made it clear that the Italian government no longer considered immigration flows as a
transitory event, but rather acknowledged that the phenomenon would continue to impose
challenges and provide opportunities to the country” (FALCI, 2011, 82). Additionally laws
were passed providing illegalized immigrants with basic rights and with access to social
services.
The next important law on migration that changed the migration regime substantially
was the Turco-Napolitano Law of 1998. The main aims of the law were on the one hand
to fight illegal immigration and on the other hand to plan and regulate the inflow of, es-
pecially labor, immigrants to the country. “Temporary detention centers” (FALCI, 2011,
86) were created and forced expulsions intensified.
The Bossi Fini Law of 2002 replaced many provisions of the law of 1998 and introduced
a closer link between residence and work and immigration while being even more rigorous
on illegalized immigration. This can be seen as an Italian version of managed migration.
“The Italian version of ‘reluctant importation’ of foreign labor has therefore been based on
an attitude of formal closure, of substantial tolerance (if not absolute, at least widespread
enough), and of a posteriori recognition of immigrant workers’ entry and inclusion, more
than on an attitude of strict control and selection of candidates”. (AMBROSINI, 2013,
189). Immigrants are widespread in the center-north provinces and immigrants are highly
represented in agriculture, less qualified services and also in significant industrial sectors,
especially in the construction sector.
2.2.6 The neoliberal migration regime in France
1974 marked the o cial end of the labor recruitment programs in France. Bor-
der controls were intensified and immigrants were incentivized to return to their home
country. As in most other European states, this did not lead to a massive return of mi-
grants. It is estimated that solely 1 % to 2 % of the recruited labor migrants went back
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to their countries of origin with the help of government programs (LAUBENTHAL, 2006).
A central characteristic of the French neoliberal migration regime was the increased strug-
gle against illegalized migration. The first laws that were passed concerning undocumented
migration in the 1980s focused on facilitating deportations of people with an illegal resi-
dence status. At the same time the first wave of legalizations of a group of 3000 illegalized
Turkish migrants took place in 1979. While being illegal was solely a precarious status
before gaining a legal residence permit during the fordist migration regimes, being illegal-
ized turned out to be a permanent situation for many immigrants during the neoliberal
migration regime. At the same time sans papiers were a fundamental part of the French
economy (VASSILIS; KARAKAYALI, 2008). Estimates suggest that between 200 000 and
one million illegalized immigrants reside in France6. „Immigrants who enter the low end
of the labor market in France, as elsewhere, can play a variety of di erent social roles.
Through no choice of their own, they often work in jobs well below their skill levels, with-
out basic protections or enforceable right, and in so doing help employers keep costs down
and undermine union e orts at representation and growth“ (TURNER, 2014, 85).
The left winged government of Mitterand in 1981 marked an important turning point.
The government campaigned with the promise to end the inhumane treatment of immi-
grants. Many of the repressive laws that had been enacted by the previous parties in
power were changed and immigrant’s possibility to gain a residence permit was facilitated
. In order to obtain a residence permit for a period of 10 years migrants merely needed
to prove that they had a work contract. However, this “generosity” was paired with an
increased struggle against “illegal” migration. Deportations and deportation centers were
institutionalized in France during this period.
Another feature of the neoliberal migration regime was a reform of the laws to gain
French citizenship. During the 1990s numerous bills were passed that made the acquisi-
tion of the French nationality more and more di cult and that subsequently decreased
the privileges of citizens of the former colonies. This dynamic also led to an increase in
immigrants in an illegal situation. Police forces were equipped with extended rights to
conduct identity controls in public places leading to increased repression of illegal immi-
grants (ABDALLAH, 2000).
Another characteristic of the neoliberal migration regime in France has been the discourse
about French identity. The French discourse couples an attachment towards France with
republican values. Secularism, as a key republican value, has been geared towards Muslims
in a gendered way. Women wearing a headscarf has been interpreted as a direct challenge
6 Numbers are from 2014.
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to republican values. The French government therefore banned the wearing of “overtly
religious symbols” in public schools in 2004 (KOFMAN, 2005).
The 2000s marked another turn in the immigration policies in France. Before, employers
were penalized with high payments if they were caught employing an illegalized immi-
grant. This was changed in 2007 with the Loi Hortefeux, which enabled employers to
apply for the legalization of their employees. However, this possibility was restricted to
certain sectors that were in need of labor. In the end this opened up the possibility for a
common struggle of sans papiers and trade unions in their work place (LÖW, 2013).
Therefore another relevant characteristic of the neoliberal migration regime was the mobi-
lization of illegalized immigrants. The two most relevant movements were the movement
of St. Bernard and the strike waves in 2008-2010. The struggle of the sans papiers were
an integral part of the social mobilizations that took place in the country in the 1990s
and 2000s which meant substantial infrastructure of collectives and supportive organiza-
tions(LÖW, 2013).
2.3 The crisis of the European migration regime
The crises of the European migration regime is inherently linked to the multiple
crisis that is persistent in the European Union. The economic crisis that started in 2008 has
not been solved yet and the social and political crisis that followed the economic crisis play
into the current management of the “migration crisis”. I will therefore briefly go into the
dynamics of the current economic crisis before describing the current migration situation
Europe. I will then briefly go into the European policy measures that have been taken
in reaction to the migration crisis. A more detailed discussion of the current migration
situation will be presented in the following chapter of this thesis.
2.3.1 The economic crisis in Europe
The crisis in Europe started with the global financial crisis of 2008. Since then
economic, political and social crisis have been present in Europe. The subprime mortgage
crisis in the USA led to a bank crisis and later to the crisis of the EURO.
The crisis in Europe was widely interpreted as a crisis of state debt. Mainstream economists
and leading heads of states blamed ill adapted social systems, high public spending, an
inflated public sector and a lack of competitiveness for the crisis. “The bourgeois society
is undergoing a multiple crisis, alongside a major crisis in the capitalist mode of pro-
duction. . .We are dealing with a crisis of the finance dominated regime of production,
which is the dominant form of valorization of capital that evolved after the 1970s as a re-
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sponse to the crisis of Fordism”(DEMIROVI∆; SABLOWSKI, 2013). The current crisis is
a “crisis of the finance-dominated regime of accumulation”(DEMIROVI∆; SABLOWSKI,
2013). The first feature is over-production. Given that wages decreased, their importance
in demand also decreased as well as state demand. The second is the increased debt. The
debt held by wage earners cannot be indefinitely expanded. Wage earners are experienc-
ing a deterioration of their standard of living while banks have to write o  large parts
of their credits. Debt also concerns states and banks. Higher taxes for wage earners and
cuts to social policies can no longer compensate for reductions of the state revenue and
the tax reductions for capital. Structural budget deficits have become the new normal
in the crisis. “Such shifting between state and private debt hardly conceals the fact that
the total amount of debt has reached heights that threaten the capacity of the system
as a whole to reproduce itself and that a massive destruction of capital may be unavoid-
able”(DEMIROVI∆; SABLOWSKI, 2013).
One of the policy measures taken by European leaders were harsh austerity programs. “In
sum, we can say that the austerity regime of the last five years is nothing more than the
final stage of implementing a neoliberal project that was initiated four decades earlier.
The sovereign debt crisis proved to be a major advance in this regard, insofar as neolib-
eral actors took advantage of it to consolidate the power of informal and unaccountable
agencies” (BUCKEL, 2016).
2.3.2 Current asylum-migration to Europe
The number of migrants seeking asylum in Europe has increased considerably in
the last 3 years7 . The two graphics show the number of asylum applicants in Europe by
country of origin and by the country the asylum was asked for. While there were 373 545
asylum applications in 2012, there were 1 393 285 in 2015. Another striking di erence
between these two years is the countries where asylum seekers apply and the countries of
origin of the migrants. Germany, France and Sweden, were among the countries that were
most attractive for those seeking asylum in 2012. France had 16,4% of the share of asylum
applications within the EU, Sweden 11,7%, and Germany 20,7%. In 2015 this changed
dramatically, with Germany being by far the country with the most asylum applications
(476 620 in 2015 representing 34,2% of the total asylum applications in the EU). France
7 When discussing migration in Europe one must not forget that the overwhelming number of migrants
are hosted in countries of the Middle East and Africa. Jordan for example hosts 1.4 million Syrians,
of which 630 000 are registered as refugees with the UNHCR. This equates to about 20% of their
total population. 70% are women and children. Lebanon hosts a high number of Syrian refugees
registered by the UNHCR – about one million. The actual number of Syrians in Lebanon is unclear
but is estimated at about 1.3 million (European Union, 2016).“As displacement rises still further, with
refugee numbers climbing to 21 million in 2015 and likely even higher in 2016, the need to find an
e ective response to both massive displacement and unmanaged migration has become increasingly
urgent“(PAPADEMETRIOU; FRATZKE, 2016)
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on the other hand only received 5, 4% of the asylum applications. These numbers suggest
that there have been significant policy changes within Europe, especially in between the
member states, that led to such great shifts of asylum seekers in between the member
states. Another important characteristic of asylum seekers in the EU is their country of
origin. It becomes clear that the number of Syrian refugees has risen significantly between
2012 and 2015. In 2014 Syrian nationals were the largest group seeking asylum in the EU.
This is clearly linked to the ongoing war in Syria and also to the high possibility of Syrian
nationals of receiving a refuge status(Migration Policy Institute, 2017).
In 2016 the EU received about 1.3 million asylum applications for 28 member states.
In 2001 asylum applications reached 424 thousand in the EU-27 8. These statistics can be
misleading however, given that asylum seekers have the possibility to repeal a negative
verdicts, there is a considerable number of asylum seekers that apply for two to three
times. Eurostat estimates 4% of the total number of asylum seekers are second or third
time applications. This latest figure for 2016 marked a decrease of 53 thousand first time
applicants across the EU-28 in comparison with the year before, as the number of first
time applicants fell from almost 1.26 million in 2015 to 1.20 million in 2016. In 2016, the
number of first time asylum applicants in the EU-28 from Syria fell back slightly to 335
thousand from 363 thousand in 2015; the share of Syrian citizens in the total dropped
from 28.9 % to 27.8 %. Afghani citizens accounted for 15 % of the total number of first
time asylum applicants and Iraqis for 11%, while Pakistanis and Nigerians accounted for
4 % each (Eurostat, 2017a).
More than four in five (83 %) of the first time asylum seekers in the EU-28 in 2016
were less than 35 years old. Those in the age range 18–34 years accounted for slightly
more than half (51 %) of the total number of first time applicants, while nearly one third
(32 %) of the total number of first time applicants were minors aged less than 18 years
(Eurostat, 2017b).
A total of 366 thousand persons were granted refugee status in the EU-28 in 2016 at
the first instance, 258 thousand were given subsidiary protection status, and 48 thousand
were given authorization to stay for humanitarian reasons . According to Eurostat (Euro-
stat, 2017b) in 2016, three fifths (61%) of EU-28 first instance asylum decisions resulted
in positive outcomes, meaning granting the status of refugee or subsidiary protection, or
an authorization to stay for humanitarian reasons. For first instance decisions, some 54%
of all positive decisions in the EU-28 in 2016 resulted in grants of refugee status. A total
of 366 000 persons were granted refugee status in the EU-28 in 2016 at first instance, 258
8 In comparison, in 1992 the EU Member States received 672 thousand applications in the EU-15. Most
of them from former Yugoslavia (Eurostat, 2017a)
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Figure 1 – Distribution of first instance decisions on (non-EU) asylum applications in
2016
(Eurostat, 2017a)
000 were given subsidiary protection status, and 48 000 were given authorisation to stay
for humanitarian reasons. Figure 1 provides an analysis of the outcome of first instance
decisions. This means that there is a significant di erence between the asylum seekers
and those that actually receive a refugee status, including all the rights that are attached
to being a refugee. Figure 1 is interesting because it compares the EU member states’
migration regimes with regard to the recognition of refugees or those in need of subsidiary
protection. It becomes clear that Germany rejects slightly more applications than Swe-
den but grants more refugee status than Sweden. Italy can be seen to reject a very large
number of applications and grants very little refugee that status. More migrants are taken
in for humanitarian reasons and subsidiary protection than for asylum reasons. France
can be seen to reject even more applications than Italy. However the refugee status is
distributed more commonly than in Italy. It is clear that the contemporary migration
regimes of the four countries discussed in this thesis deal with refugees and asylum in
di erent ways.
Considering the four countries of interest to this thesis, it becomes clear that
all four take up particular positions within the European migration regime. Considering
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Figure 2 – Number of (non-EU) asylum seekers in the EU and EFTA Member States in
2015 and 2016
(Eurostat, 2017a)
Figure 2 the number of first time asylum applicants in Germany increased from 442
thousand in 2015 to 722 thousand in 2016. Italy also reported large increases. Conversely,
Sweden’s shares of the EU-28 total each fell more than 10% between 2015 and 2016. As
can be shown in Figure 2, Germany, Italy and France have all experienced an increase in
asylum seekers while Sweden, in the other hand, has experienced a decrease.
2.3.3 European policies in course of the crisis of migration
The crisis of migration and especially of refugees to Europe has spurred reactions
among European leaders. I argue that it is not possible to distinguish a coherent strategic
response on a European level. This is one of the characteristics of a certain migration
regime being in a crisis. There are, nevertheless, attempts to create a common migration
strategy in Europe. These attempts include measures taken to secure the external borders
of the European Union. There have been negotiations trying to strengthen the borders
of so called transition countries in order to prevent migrants from entering European wa-
ters. This concerns mainly Northern African states and recently also Turkey. I will give
a description of both dynamics. It is important to understand the dynamics of European
migration policies in response to the migration crisis in order to contextualize the four
countries I am focusing on in this thesis. Germany, Sweden, France and Italy not only
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maneuver within the European framework, they also actively shape the European migra-
tion policies. Documents by the European Commission will serve as a means of analyzing
European migration policies.
2.3.3.1 Returns as a means of controlling migration
A main aim of European leaders has been to focus on returns. This is supposed
to uphold the image that the states and the EU are in control of the migration flows.
In March 2016 the EU reached a deal with Turkey that allows a quick return of unau-
thorized migrants, especially from Greece, to Turkey. Similar deals are being negotiated
with other countries. Sweden and Germany and the European Union in 2016 all signed
readmission agreements with Afghanistan intended to facilitate the return of large num-
bers of Afghan nationals. A new terminal is reportedly in the works at the Kabul airport
in order to accommodate the large numbers of migrants expected to be sent back. The
Afghanistan agreements—and similar ones being negotiated with Nigeria, Jordan, and
Tunisia and recently concluded with Mali—mark a pronounced shift in approach as mi-
gration has worked its way up to the highest levels of national and EU foreign policy
agendas. This means that migration policies have far reaching geo-political implications.
European countries seek to obtain these deals by o ering facilitated visa procedures or
trade incentives in return. “Policymakers everywhere have become increasingly aware of
the need to pair protection and integration with investments in the capacity to manage
flows, a crucial part of upholding trust in the migration system. In Europe, governments
have turned their attention to returns, partly in an e ort to deter unauthorized entries
and unfounded claims“ (PAPADEMETRIOU; FRATZKE, 2016).
It is clear that European leaders are in need of demonstrating that they are in con-
trol of the migration –situation. Especially combating irregular migration into the EU
seems an important priority9
2.3.3.2 Externalizing European borders
Even though the European member states are divided on internal migration poli-
cies, they are surprisingly united when it comes to the external migration policies with
third countries. “Despite widespread disunity on migration issues between EU Member
9 The European Commission states that: “As regards the medium and long term, the Commission
proposes guidelines in four policy areas: reducing incentives for irregular immigration; border man-
agement – saving lives and securing external borders; developing a sound common asylum policy based
on the implementation of Europe’s Common European Asylum System, but also assessing and, possi-
bly, revising the Dublin Regulation in 2016; lastly, establishing a new policy on regular immigration,
modernising and revising the ‘blue card’ system, setting fresh priorities for integration policies and
optimising the benefits of migration policy for the individuals concerned and for countries of origin,
for example by facilitating cheaper, faster and more secure remittance transfers“(European Council,
2017).
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States, there is a rare consensus regarding the urgency and necessity of halting Central
Mediterranean migration...“ (COLLETT, 2017).
The documents of the European Commission from June 2016 confirm this approach.
In the Communication on the progress of the partnership framework with third countries,
the European Commission clearly states that they will work closely with third countries
in order to hinder irregular migration. The countries that are mentioned are countries of
origin of a large number of irregular migrants in Europe and so called transit countries.
The document, however, also mentions refugees and seeks a closer relationship to countries
that host a large number of refugees. Concerning Jordan, the Commission states: “The
focus on strengthening the institutional and economic resilience of both countries while
enhancing services and economic opportunities for Syrian refugees and host communities,
through increased protection, access to employment, quality education and basic services.
This has included an agreement with Jordan in July to simplify the rules of origin that
Jordanian exporters use in their trade with the EU, making it easier to access the EU
market, while helping Jordan find employment for the Syrian refugees in the country.“
(European Union, 2016, 11). Trade incentives for Jordan are traded in order to facilitate
the re-admission of irregular migrants to the country.
During the most recent informal European summit in Malta at the beginning of February
2017 (European Council, 2017) this policy approach towards migration and third coun-
tries was re-a rmed. The European leaders met to discuss how to stem the migration
flow from Libya to Italy. This includes, mainly, strategies on how to prevent migrants
leaving the Libyan cost to enter European waters. EU laws state that vessels that enter
European waters need to be rescued and brought to the European territory where full
European asylum laws apply. Therefore the member states of the EU are looking more
closely at the so called “transition countries”. Their aim is to relocate the responsibility
of rescue and search of migrants trying to cross the sea onto these countries, ultimately
reducing the number of migrants that reach the EU.
Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt are being discussed as potential partners. Concern-
ing Libya the EU is concentrating mainly on “equipping the Libyan government with the
means to prevent maritime departures, pull back boats that depart, and o er stranded mi-
grants a one-way ticket home“ (COLLETT, 2017). Strengthening the Libyan coast guard
is a main pillar of the strategy. The negotiations with Libya are less a deal than a reloca-
tion of financial support for certain operations and aims. Elisabeth Collett’s (COLLETT,
2017) analysis of the envisaged approach towards Libya is very skeptical: “Unfortunately,
EU leaders cannot a ord to publicly acknowledge a blunt truth: that Libya will not be
able to do much of what is being asked of it. The European Union is negotiating with
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a government that does not have a strong hold on the country.“ Additionally there are
no significant plans to aid and protect migrants stranded in Libya. Detention centers in
Libya have been described as inadequate and inhumane.
Another country the EU heads of state have considered is Tunisia. Here again, the EU
member states want Tunisia to help prevent migrants from leaving the country. Tunisia,
similar to Libya, does not have adequate infrastructure for a large number of migrants.
The camps that held migrants from Libya were run by the UNHCR and have recently
been dismantled. Other countries that the EU leaders are negotiating with include Egypt
and Algeria (COLLETT, 2017).
2.3.3.3 The EU-Turkey Agreement
The EU-Turkey agreement deserves special attention since it is a unique attempt
by European leaders to hinder asylum seekers form entering European territory. The num-
ber of refugees residing in Turkey has gone up considerably. In 2016 about three million
refugees were registered in Turkey, of which 2.7 million are Syrian nationals. The second
and third largest groups were Iraqi and Afghan citizens.
47% of the Syrian refugees are under the age of 18. Another interesting fact is that
the overwhelming majority of Syrian refugees live in urban communities and only 9% live
in camps. About half of the 2.7 million refugees live in the city of Istanbul The surge
in the number of refugees that Turkey is hosting has given Turkey considerable political
leverage in negotiations with the European Union. Given the increased concern of irregu-
lar migration into the EU, European leaders have sought to strike a deal with Turkey in
order to stem the inflow of migrants.
An important milestone is the EU-Turkey deal concluded in March 2016. Irregular mi-
grants, including refugees, arriving in Greece can be sent back to Turkey, according to
the deal. In return Europe obliges itself to take in a Syrian refugee for each Syrian that
has been returned to Turkey. However, this number has been has been capped at 72,000,
far short of the 108 000 a year recommended by international aid agencies. Additionally
the EU-accession talks with Turkey have been “re-energized” and the EU is looking into
easing visa requirements for Turkish citizens10 (RANKIN, 2016).
The deal has been heavily criticized by NGOs and civil society organizations. Marie
Elisabeth Ingres, the head of mission of Doctors Without Borders in Greeece published
the following statement after the EU-Turkey deal was reached in March 2016: “We made
10 The political ties and conflicts with Tukey have changed recently. The status of this analysis is April
2017.
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the extremely di cult decision to end our activities in Moria because continuing to work
inside would make us complicit in a system we consider to be both unfair and inhuman.
We will not allow our assistance to be instrumentalized for a mass expulsion operation,
and we refuse to be part of a system that has no regard for the humanitarian or protection
needs of asylum seekers and migrants“ (ARRUZZA, 2016).
Additionally Turkey has been widely criticized for its treatment of migrants and refugees.
“To make things even worse, according to Amnesty International, Turkey is currently
illegally returning thousands of Syrian refugees to Syria. De facto, through its agree-
ment with Turkey, the EU is about to send thousands of refugees to the slaughterhouse“
(ARRUZZA, 2016).
2.3.3.4 The Suspension of the Schengen Area
The suspension of parts of the Schengen area11 is an important aspect to the crisis
of the migration regime. Even though my thesis analyzes four countries of the European
Union, it is important to comprehend the entire picture of parts of the suspension of the
Schengen area. Therefore I will refer to several European Union countries that have been
responsible for the implementation of border controls within the EU.
France, Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Great Britain and Norway have all partly
suspended the free movement of individuals across their borders. Germany, Austria, Den-
mark, Sweden and Norway have all announced to keep up border controls until at least
May 2017 (European Council, 2017). Other member states have taken even more drastic
steps in an attempt to stifle migration. Hungary has constructed a fence on its border to
Serbia, leaving migrants stranded on the border (ARRUZZA, 2016). In the beginning of
the march 2017 the Hungarian government approved the installation of movement-sensors
on the fence that seals o  the border to Serbia. The country’s president Vitor Orban said
“migration is the Trojan horse of terrorism” (VERSECK, 2017).
2.3.4 The policy responses in Sweden
Sweden has been governed by a minority government, which includes the Green
Party, since September 2014. Policy responses to the migration crisis were marked by the
sharp rise in support for the anti-immigration Sweden Democrats which are currently the
third strongest party in the county. Sweden has passed several repressive laws in order to
stem the influx of migrants and refugees.
11 The Schengen Area is an area comprising 26 European states that have o cially abolished passport
and all other types of border control at their mutual borders.
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In 2015 16,8% of the population were immigrants. Of the immigrant population 50,6%
were women (??). The Swedish Migration Agency, a government department responsible
for processing claims, introduced tougher rules in July 2016, designed to deter and keep
out asylum seekers. Sweden introduced border controls and therefore made it harder for
migrants to enter in the first place. Additionally, stricter rules surrounding family reunion
were put in place. Yet another measure was withdrawing housing for failed asylum seekers
and the expansion of immigration detention(MOORE, 2016).
Furthermore the Swedish government has started to concentrate on the encouragement of
returns. Currently, the Swedish government pays 3 911 Euros to individuals that leave the
country and 9 611 Euros to families that decide to go back to their original country. This,
together with other measures, has led to the number of asylum applications dropping in
Sweden (ENGLAND, 2016).
The Swedish government is in need to demonstrate that their strategy is working. In
this sense the o cial website of Immigration to Sweden states that „The number of asy-
lum seekers dropped dramatically – from 163 000 in the peak year of 2015 to 29 000
– much due to changes in Swedish migration laws“ (O cial Website of Immigration to
Sweden, 2017).
2.3.5 The policy responses in Germany
The current situation in Germany is marked by several dynamics. The „Summer of
Migration“ in 2015 started an important dynamic in the migration policy of the country.
After the end of the “Summer of Migration” in 2015, the responses of the government to-
wards migration and towards refugees was geared towards giving the public the impression
that they are in control of the situation. This resulted in several more repressive measures.
In order to put migration into a comparative perspective to the other three countries of
interest to this thesis, it is important to note that in 2015 14,9% of the population were
immigrants. Of these immigrants, 52,4% were women (??).
In the summer of 2015 the German Chancellor Merkel o ered temporary asylum to
refugees, prompting a mass movement of people through the Balkan states towards Ger-
many in autumn and winter. Borders were declared open and images of thousands of mi-
grants making their way from Greece to the Balkans, then to Austria and Germany dom-
inated the media. The German head of state, Merkel, gave a speech welcoming refugees
to Germany. Among the arrivals of the migrants a Willkommenskultur (literally welcom-
ing culture) emerged. A civil society movement emerged taking food and clothes to the
camps, taking refugees to meetings with the authorities in their own cars, paying their
fares, teaching German, translating forms, sharing couches and bikes and opening up soc-
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cer clubs, schools and kindergartens for refugee kids (AKRAP, 2015). “In Germany, we
are seeing thousands of people who were never politically active but who suddenly decide
that it is their mission to help out with refugees” (BUCKEL, 2016).
Soon after the „Summer of Migration“ in 2015, particularly conservative forces in Ger-
many called for more control and for a stop to the open door policy. The extreme right
party in Germany, AfD, was elected into several regional parliaments giving xenophobic
discourses more visibility. Another turning point in the public debate about migration
was New Years Eve of 2016 when the main German media outlets took up a story of a
group of migrants harassing women. Subsequently the image of menacing migrant men
that “swamp” the country emerged. A famous liberal feminist, Alice Schwarzer, brought
the term “sex wars” into the discourse, further nurturing racist sentiments in the German
society (HESS et al., 2016).
On a political level, several repressive measures have been implemented in order to stop
migrants form coming to Germany. New asylum legislations make it more di cult to
obtain a refugee status and new law on integration make it more di cult to receive a
residence permit. Additionally, the closure of the Balkan route and the reinstallation of
border controls make it harder for migrants to enter the country. The recent discussion
to consider Afghanistan as a “secure” country of origin would make it possible to deport
migrants to Afghanistan12 (HESS et al., 2016). The German government has made a point
to prove that they have managed to halt the large numbers of migrants coming to the
country. Germany has claimed that in 2016 280,000 asylum seekers arrived which is a
drop of more than 600,000 compared to the previous year (??). The upcoming elections
in fall have made it particularly important for the government to insist that they have
regained control over the situation of migration into Germany.
2.3.6 The policy responses in Italy
The current migration situation in Italy is marked by its Southern border being an
entrance to the European Union for many migrants, by migrant riots and by the unstable
domestic political situation.
On a political level, Italy saw the long-term right winged Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi
ousted from o ce and an interim Prime Minister Renzi take o ce for two years (2014 -
2016). The current Prime Minister Paulo Gentiloni was voted into o ce in December 2016.
The ongoing Mediterranean refugee and migration crisis is on the very top of the current
government’s agenda. While most routes to Europe have been closed in the meantime,
12 There has been large criticism of this intent, showing that Afghanistan is far from being a safe
country(TAZ, 2016)
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among them the Balkan route and the Greek border with Turkey, the coastlines of Italy,
which stretch more than 7,600 km and are di cult to control for the European border
agency FRONTEX, remain an entrance for migrants (BENEDIKTER; KAROLEWSKI,
2017).
Within the European Union, Italy has repeatedly lobbied to have exceptions of the strict
rules on government debt. In October 2016, the Minister for Economy and Finance Pier
Carlo Padoan estimated that Italy will have to spend at least 3.8bn euros on refugees and
migrants in 2017 alone, which according to Padoan was the most conservative estimate
under “stable circumstances”. Any increase in the number of refugees and ongoing EU
passivity would cost Italy at least around 4.2bn euros. Italy has warned that this could
lead to the breach of EU fiscal rules, as Italy’s 2017 deficit would rise to 3.2 per cent.
However, especially the German government has interpreted this as an attempt for Italy
for undermine the deficit rules and has therefore been the main country to block Italy’s
attempts to opt out of the deficit rules due to the migration situation (BENEDIKTER;
KAROLEWSKI, 2017).
There have been several refugee riots in southern Italy after the closing of the Balkan
migration route in the beginning of 2016. Refugees that are registered in Italy wait an
average of 18 months for their asylum applications to be processed. Additionally the
Mafia Costa Nostra has been dominating refugee-related services in the South of Italy.
The services provided to the largest camp in Europe CARA Mineo are believed to be run
by mafia related businesses that intimidated other contractors to opt out of the bidding
process. Furthermore “the Mafia-a liated cleaning and catering operations that won the
bids are providing lower-quality services than the legitimate ones would have, thereby
driving up their margins“ (POLIZER; KASSIE, 2016) Unsurprisingly, the mafia is also
involved in human tra cking and in smuggling migrants across the Mediterranean and
form South to Northern Italy (POLIZER; KASSIE, 2016).
Also the promise to relocate refugees from Italy to other European countries failed, with
only 560 people instead of the originally declared 39,600 transferred to other EU nations
by autumn 2016 (BENEDIKTER; KAROLEWSKI, 2017).
2.3.7 The policy responses in France
The main and most relevant events in France during the so called migration crisis
were on the one hand the demolition of the Calais Camp in the North of France with
all its consequences and the Presidential elections that took place in May. The far right
party “Front National” has increasingly gained support in France. In the polls before the
French Presidential elections, the FN was even placed first at times. Due to this pressure
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from the far right, the Socialist President of the Republic tried to demonstrate that he
is in control of the migration situation and that he is putting policies into place the will
decrease migration to France.
In 2015 12,1% of the population were immigrants. Of the immigrants in France 51,4%
were women (??). After pressure from local inhabitants, lorry drivers and the UK govern-
ment, the French President Holland vowed to close the make shift camp of migrants and
refugees called „the jungle“. The migrants living in "the Jungle" on the edge of Calais,
attempted to cross the tunnel to get into the UK. They tried to stow away on lorries
headed for Eurotunnel, or jump or cut security fences to try to hide on Eurotunnel trains
themselves. They also tried to board lorries bound for cross-Channel ferries. This led to
protests of French lorry drivers. The UK also tightened security at the entrance of the
tunnel in an attempt to close o  this route for migrants to enter the country. At the
moment of the closure of the camp an estimated 9000 migrants were living there (BBC,
2015). In 2016 The French government demolished the camp and relocated some of the
former residents.
However, after the demolishment of the Jungle in Calais, many refugees and migrants
starting camping on the streets of Paris. Metro stops in Paris became sheltered camps
for migrants. The metro stop „Stalingrad“ was the home to about 100 migrants. After
pressure form mostly business elites, the mayor of Paris opened a migrant shelter for 400
men. The city’s police has also been part of the e ort to clear the capital of hundreds
of improvised camps. Many migrants have now been pushed to the outskirts of the city
(PISER, 2016).
Another measure taken by the French government was to o er cash to migrants who
return to their country of origin. 2500 Euros was o ered as well as a plane ticket and
financial help to set up a business in their home country if they leave before the end of
2016 (BULMAN, 2016). This measure had more symbolic character than an actual e ect
on migration itself and need to be seen in the context of the then upcoming Presidential
elections.
2.4 Conclusion of Chapter 2
In this chapter I have given an overview of the historical development of the migra-
tion regimes in Europe, with specific focus on Germany, Italy, Sweden and France. This
chapter has enabled me to establish a comparative perspective of these four countries.
By embedding the narration of migration in these four countries into a general European
framework, it was possible to analyze di erences and similar dynamics concerning migra-
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tion.
The Fordist migration regime was marked by a mixture of guest-worker programs and
colonial ties in the four countries I consider in this thesis. Migration was key to economic
reconstruction in Germany, France, Italy and Sweden after the Second World War. In Ger-
many, the guest worker regime was highly organized, with o cial recruitment strategies
by the government and bilateral agreements with numerous countries to facilitate labor
migration. Sweden was marked by a similar dynamic. The country was also strongly in
need of labor migration, even if at an earlier period than Germany. The Swedish govern-
ment facilitated immigration, attracting mainly migrants from the neighboring countries,
notably Finland. The trade unions played an important role in the organization of labor
migration to the country, hindering the undercutting of social standards. Here, Sweden
stands out as the only country of the four that are of concern to my thesis, where trade
unions play a substantial role in the organization of the guest worker regime. In France,
similarly, migrant workers played an important role in the economy after World War
Two. The French government and French companies recruited guest workers abroad. A
specificity of the French Fordist migration regime is marked by (post) colonial ties. These
(post) colonial ties led to a dynamic where illegalized migration was an accepted part of
the migration regime and a phase many migrants passed through before being in a regu-
larized situation. Even though Italy primarily served as an emigration country in Europe,
the internal migration has many similarities to the immigration to Germany, Sweden and
France. The South of Italy served as a labor supplier to the North of the country. Even
though they were part of the same country, the migrants form Southern Italy faced many
similar challenges in the North. However, an important di erence to the guest-worker
regimes of the other three countries is that the Southern Italian migrants were citizens of
Italy and therefore possessed all the rights associated with citizenship.
In the 1970s Sweden (1972), Germany (1973) and France (1974) o cially stopped their
labor recruitment programs and shifted towards a “zero migration” policy. The dominant
form of migration was thereafter organized through family reunification and through asy-
lum. Italy stands slightly apart from the other three countries. The neoliberal migration
regime also marks the first time international migration became an issue for the country.
Nevertheless, the same characteristics apply to the neoliberal migration in Italy. Illegal-
ized immigration became more and more common in the all four countries, whereas it
was the strongest in France and Italy. Starting from the 1990s onwards a Europeanization
of migration policies can be observed. This was accompanied by yet another shift in the
migration regime – away from the zero migration policies towards a selective opening
towards labor migrants. The EU enlargement in 2004 led to labor migration within the
European Union from Eastern European countries to Western and Northern European
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countries. In Germany the specific form of managed migration entered into force with a
new piece of legislation in 2005, simplifying access to the labor market for highly qualified
migrants. In France the Loi Hortefeux enabled employers to apply for a work and resi-
dence permit for their employees and in Sweden a law on “labor immigration” was passed
in 2008, expanding labor migration to the country. The Turco-Napolitano law in 1998
and later the Bossi Fini law in 2002 was the first attempt of the Italian government to
implement a sort of managed migration. The Dublin regulations mark a Europeanization
of the asylum aspect of the migration regime. Another factor that has been relevant in
Sweden, Germany, France and Italy alike is that on the level of discourse, asylum seekers
and migrants have been linked to negative aspects of society. Especially asylum seekers
have featured prominently as the “other”. The rise in racist sentiments and attacks can
be registered in all four countries. In Germany, housing for asylum seekers was set on
fire. In France an intense discussion about republican values and secularism cemented the
otherness of migrants. In Sweden, very similar to Germany, refugee camps were set on fire
by underground right winged groups.
Currently, the migration regime in all four countries is faced with increased asylum-
migration. Germany, Italy and France have all experienced an increase in first time asylum
applications between 2015 and 2016. While Sweden has experienced a decrease, it was still
among the number one countries to receive asylum seekers in 2015. The current situation
has prompted reactions on a European level such as attempts to further externalize the
European borders with deals such as the one with Turkey. However a common European
response has not been strong enough or coherent enough. Several European Member States
have reinstalled their borders, leading to a suspension of the Schengen area. For Italy this
has meant a permanent struggle with the other European states about deficit rules and
relocation programs. Due to its geographical location Italy has become a transit country,
leading to the participation of the mafia in handling refugee related infrastructure in the
South of the country. Germany experienced a drastic shift from a Willkommenskultur to
more restrictive measures, trying to decrease the number of refugees arriving. Similarly,
Sweden has also shifted from being a very open country towards refugees to implementing
policies that are supposed to quench asylum seekers from coming. France has taken the
drastic step of literally dismantling a large migrant camp in the North of country. By
o ering an amount of money to returning migrants, France hopes to push asylum seekers
and migrants away.
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3 Challenges of Contemporary Migration and
Trade Unions
This chapter aims to analyze the relationship between immigration and the labor
movement. I will firstly briefly describe the Keynes’ view of employment and his con-
cept of “involuntary unemployment”. This author’s approach had significant impacts on
the labor movements in Western Europe and on trade unions. I will briefly outline the
debate on the e ect of migration for the labor market. Subsequently the di ering trade
union traditions in Western Europe will be discussed. The four countries of interest to
this thesis, Italy, Germany, France and Sweden can each be identified as having a diverg-
ing approach to trade unionism. In order to comprehend how the trade unions of each
country take up a position and struggle for workers rights it is important to grasp the
industrial relations of each country. In the case of Germany and Sweden, there is a strong
institutional incorporation of the trade unions into policy making. In Italy and France the
trade union movement is able to influence the government by mobilizations. Ultimately,
I will discuss the relationship between trade unions and migrants. Firstly, I review the
existing literature on the topic and the main contradictions in the relationship between
immigrants and trade unions. Then, I will analyze the four countries I have chosen for
this thesis separately. I give a brief historical account of the trade union’s positions on
migration and then concentrate on moments that have changed the trade union’s posi-
tions, actions and perspectives. I focus largely on the last decade. Final conclusions of this
chapter will bring together the theoretical assumptions of Keynes, the traditions of the
industrial relations of each country and its consequences for the trade union’s approaches
and positions towards immigrants in their country.
The analysis of the trade unions of Italy, Germany, France and Sweden will be focused
mainly on the confederations. For Italy I choose to concentrate mainly (but not solely) on
the trade union CGIL, given that it is the largest. The German trade union confederation,
DGB, serves as the main example for trade union actions in Germany. However, the secto-
rial trade unions Ver.di and IG Metall are mentioned since they have been at the forefront
of a changing attitude towards migrants. These two sectorial trade unions are also the
most influential in the German Trade Union Confederation. In France, the CGT is subject
to my research. It is the largest trade union confederation in France and has spearheaded
strikes of illegalized immigrants in the country. The trade union confederation LO-Sweden
is represented in my country example of Sweden as it is the largest confederation of the
country and has featured the most prominently in influencing immigration policies.
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3.1 Unemployment from a Keynesian Perspective
The following section will give an overview of the labor market and particularly
unemployment from a Keynesian perspective. By contrasting Keynesian views to neo-
classical approaches, I explain involuntary unemployment and why this was a theoretical
shift. Understanding the basic points of the Keynesian concept of the labor market is
important to comprehend strategic choices of the labor movements I am analyzing in this
thesis. The trade union movement in Western Europe has internalized many of Keynes’
approaches.
Keynes’ labor market analysis is scattered throughout the pages of the General The-
ory (1936)(KEYNES, 2016). It must be said that even though Keynes contradicts the
Classical Theory on a range of issues, he does see himself in their tradition: “A large
part of the established body of economic doctrine I cannot but accept as broadly correct”
(Keynes, 1987, 489). Keynes criticizes the main assumption of the Classical Theory: the
notion of the Equilibrium. He states that in fact, the idea of an Equilibrium does not
apply to all markets. In particular, it does not apply to the labor market. In Keynes’
view the economy is not merely working to satisfy needs but first and foremost to make
money. In this sense money is not neutral. Here again Keynes di ers from the Classical
Theory. “ I am saying that booms and depressions are phenomena peculiar to an econ-
omy in which – in some significant sense which I am not attempting to define precisely
in this place – money is not neutral” (KEYNES, 1987, 144). For him money is the goal
of production, not production itself. Keynes also rejects the idea that workers and firms
meet at the labor market on equal terms. For Keynes, companies possess significantly
more power and are able to set prices and have the power to decide to employ workers or
not to employ workers. He therefore introduced the idea that unemployment is a problem
of macroeconomics and not a problem of the individual that is unemployed.
The theory that Keynes developed introduces two key variables: Investment and Con-
sumption. Both are vital for the functioning of the economy and for employment. “The
right course is to get rid of the scarcity of capital goods – which will rid us at the same
time of most of the evils of capitalism – whilst also moving in the direction of increasing
the share of income falling to those whose economic welfare will gain most by their having
the chance to consume more” (KEYNES, 1987, 491). Spending decisions are crucial for
the creation of employment according to the e ective demand principle, which is a critical
element of Keynes ideas. For Keynes employment is pivotal in a society and unemploy-
ment represents a moral problem. Therefore he, unlike the Classical Theory, assumes that
involuntary unemployment does exist in a capitalist society and needs to be considered
as a main challenge. Involuntary unemployment stems from a lack of investment in the
real sphere. It originates in a deficient e ective demand. This happens when the expected
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money profit is too low. Given that Keynes identifies unemployment as a main problem
of the capitalist society, he argues that the e ective demand cannot be left to the market
alone. Government interventions are essential. Here again, he contradicts Classical theo-
ries that assume that the market will regulate itself and is best left alone. Spending, so
Keynes, creates income and employment. Keynes’ central variable of Investment is linked
to the creation of employment. Investment means investing in production and creating
the capacities of production. This is closely linked to the notion of Consumption. “Con-
sumption – to repeat the obvious – is the sole end and object of all economic activity.
Opportunities for employment are necessarily limited by the extent of aggregate demand.
Aggregate demand derives only from present consumption or from present provision for
future consumption” (KEYNES, 2016). However, it must be noted that Consumption is
not an autonomous spending decision, as it depends on income. Investment, as an au-
tonomous spending decision, is more important for the creation of employment. Keynes
considers involuntary unemployment a natural part of capitalist society. It is a result of
the economic system working normally. However, he argues that it is necessary to limit
unemployment within a society to a minimum.
In summary, the creation of employment was the main discussion for Keynes. He states
that the employment creation is a decision taken by the entrepreneurs who are driven by
their search for profits and by their expectations of sale. Keynes observes an asymmetry of
power between entrepreneurs and workers. This had practical consequences for large parts
of the labor movement in Europe. Given the asymmetrical power between entrepreneurs
and workers, the necessity to empower workers through an organization such as trade
unions is justified and much needed.
3.2 Contemporary Theories of Migration and the Labor Market
Most research that focuses on the e ects of migration on the wages of workers that
already reside in the country find that there is little to no impact. Some even find that
there is actually a slightly positive e ect for the wages of those already in the country
of destination. One of the main concerns of trade unions is the development of wages
and working conditions for their members. Given that the following chapter will analyze
trade unions’ positions of migration, it is important to review the existing literature on
the topic of migration and wages.
Several academics (CATTANEO et al., 2015), (DOCQUIER et al., 2010),(FOGED; PERI,
2016),(MANACORDA et al., 2012), have found that immigration has a positive e ect on
average native wages and reduces inequality. The main threat to wages as well as to in-
equality in Europe is emigration. This is because the highly educated tend to emigrate and
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create a gap that is not easily filled. “Immigration to Europe was somewhat more benefi-
cial to the non educated natives, reducing their wage gap with the highly educated, while
the opposite is true of emigration. These surprising results imply that several European
countries should begin to discuss more seriously the causes and e ects of their significant
emigration rates, especially of their highly educated professionals, rather than obsessing
with immigration that has mostly been beneficial in economic terms”(DOCQUIER et al.,
2010). Docquier (DOCQUIER et al., 2010) shows that during the period of 1990 until
2000 immigration has had zero until a slight positive e ect on the wages of those already
in the country.Immigration can have a positive on wages since it tends to move “native”
workers (CATTANEO et al., 2015) to higher skilled jobs. This upward mobility means
that the wages for workers already in the country rise with a short delay of a year or two.
The authors strictly contradict the crowding out theory of native workers by immigrants.
Similar conclusions have been made in research that scrutinized a specific European coun-
try. Foged (FOGED; PERI, 2016) analyzed immigrants that came to Denmark between
1991 and 2008 and assessed their influence on low skilled native workers. By analyzing
longitude data they find that immigrants actually have a positive e ect on native workers.
Immigrants push native workers to less manual-intensive activities and therefore unskilled
workers experience an upward mobility. “ We do not observe an increased probability of
unemployment, nor a decrease in employment for unskilled natives”(FOGED; PERI, 2016,
29).Manacorda et al (MANACORDA et al., 2012) conducted a study looking at the wage
development with respect to immigration in the United Kingdom. They analyze date
from the 1970s to the mid 2000s. By the mid 2000s the working age population that was
born overseas was at 12% compared to 7% in the mid 1970s. The three authors find that
immigration did not have an e ect on the wages of native workers in the UK. The rea-
son for this is that immigrant workers are imperfect substitutes in production for native
workers of the same age group. The only sizable e ect on wages can be found for the
wages of already existing immigrants. They conclude that it is unclear if the same can be
said for other OECD countries given that labor market structures vary from country to
country. However, this is yet another paper that contradicts the common discourse that
immigrants take away jobs of native workers and drive down wages.
3.2.1 Debate about the e ect of current migration for Europe’s economies
There have been several studies trying to calculate the costs of migration and
trying to make predictions on the e ects of wages and the labor markets in Europe in
general. Here, similar to the conclusions presented in the previous section, most agree
that there will be no relevant e ect on employment and wages of those already residing
in the receiving countries. The current literature mostly agrees that migration is not a
game-changer and has little e ect on the GDP and wages.
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I will briefly review the current academic debate and studies on the impact of the cur-
rent refugees and immigrants that arrived in Europe. Interestingly, especially research
conducted by international organizations stress the importance of migration and the very
positive e ects the current migration can have for the European countries. Not surpris-
ingly, there is also a strand of research that makes the case for more and tighter restrictions
on migration. These arguments are worth reviewing because they play a role in the public
debate about migration in Europe.
The OECD Migration Outlook of 2016(OECD, 2016) stresses the impact of immigrants
on public infrastructure and services. They conclude that “immigrants can exacerbate
structural problems, notably in housing and education, it is generally not the source of
these problems”. A recent paper published by the International Monetary Fund (AIYAR
et al., 2016) indicates that the unemployment of native workers will not rise due to the
refugees and migrants that have come to Europe in the last two years. They state there
will be a modest increase in GDP growth due to the fiscal expansion that is associated
with the financial support asylum seekers and refugees receive. The policy recommenda-
tion of the IMF is to facilitate the labor market access for asylum seekers, refugees and
migrants, and therefore making them contribute to public finances through taxes as soon
as possible. Unfortunately, the IMF additionally argues that high minimum wages will
hinder refugees from finding employment. This is similar to the debate about the mini-
mum wage in Germany The lowering or suspension of minimum wages for refugees and
company subsidies will incentivize employers.
Another study published by the IMF (JAUMOTTE et al., 2016) in 2016 argues simi-
larly but emphasizes even more strongly the gains in the GDP of host countries due to
immigration. By raising the labor productivity immigrants have a significant impact on
the countries they immigrate to: “1 percentage point increase in the share of migrants in
the adult population can raise GDP per capita by up to 2 % in the long run” (Jaumontte
et al., 2016, 1). Given the ageing population in the “advanced economies” a migrant
labor force can help sustain public finances. Furthermore both low and high skilled mi-
grants can produce positive productivity e ects given that their skills are complementary
to those of native workers. The authors additionally stress that immigration benefits all
income groups. The income per capita rises both at the top 10 % income the bottom
90 %. The Gini coe cient is not a ected by immigration. This study by the IMF also
includes a gender specific dimension, arguing that increased immigration leads to an in-
creased labor market participation of native women. This is due to a greater availability
of household and childcare possibilities provided by women. The study warns that if mi-
grants are not able to integrate into the labor market this might create pressure on social
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security systems and create social tensions that might lead to a political backlash against
immigration. This study concludes that a rapid labor market integration of migrations is
the key to reaping the gains. Language training, the recognition of skills of migrants and
lower barriers to entrepreneurship should be introduced.
The strand of research that calls for tighter restrictions on migration argues that mi-
gration barriers in fact raise global economic e ciency. Reducing migration barriers could
result in too much migration and therefore reducing e ciency by lowering productivity
in high productivity places. This highly problematical strand of economic research sees
low productivity as something that spreads from poor to rich countries and that mi-
grants transmit through culture and institutions “like disease or pollution” (CLEMENS;
PRITCHETT, 2016, 7). This is known as the “Epidemiological Model” that is propa-
gated by Paul Collier, the best selling author of the book “Exodus: how migration is
changing out world” and Oxford academic as a representative of this trend. Collier argues
that there is a need to reduce migration significantly (CLEMENS; PRITCHETT, 2016).
“However, the rate at which migrants are assimilating appears to be slower than had been
expected. Immigrants have tended to cluster, and this reduces social interaction outside
the group. Hence, after the surge in immigration since 1997, it may be sensible to have a
temporary phase of slower immigration while we take stock of its social consequences. The
economic consequences of a pause would be negligible as long as students were exempted.“
(COLLIER, 2014). He appeals to the Left to “free us from the myth of the open door“
(COLLIER, 2014).
The economic models and presumptions have been contradicted and proven wrong by
numerous economists, showing that cultural diversity is positive for local markets or
that areas with greater number of immigrants have experiences greater income growth.
Clemens (CLEMENS; PRITCHETT, 2016) uses similar parameters as the advocates of
the „Epidemiological Model“ and contradict their findings, arguing for a relaxation of
immigration controls.
3.3 The Varieties of Trade Unionism in Europe
This section will present theories of trade unions in Europe and possibilities to
conceptualize the di erent traditions that exist within the labor movements of Italy, Ger-
many, France and Sweden. Hyman’s theory of trade unions (HYMAN, 2001) makes it
possible to classify the trade unions in Western Europe within the triangle of Society,
Market and Class. The varieties of trade unionism approach, which takes many of Hay-
man’s concepts into account, further enables the classification of the trade union traditions
in Italy, Germany, France and Sweden.
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Figure 3 – Trade Union Triangle from Hyman
(HYMAN, 2001)
Trade Unions are organizations that enable employees to protect themselves. Employees
have certain interests to defend. One of these is the exchange of labor power for money
and the other is labor process itself. Therefore trade unions deal with, on the one hand
wage negotiations, sick pay etc. and on the other side also with working conditions and
labor intensity and health and safety at the workplace. As an ultimate weapon in order
to struggle or defend these interests, trade unions can use a strike. “A workers’ associa-
tion which rejects the strike tactic altogether on principle, or never even threatens strike
action, cannot really be considered a trade union” (LINDEN, 2008, 220). Trade Unions
may criticize market relations and social power relations, however, “they also regulate
and normalize the employment relationship” (HYMAN, 2001).
Apart from these unifying characteristics, a pluralism of trade unions exists in Europe.
This is due to di erent definitions of the very nature of trade unions, varying concepts
of the purpose of collective organization and di erences in strategies and tactics. This
has shaped trade union members, their ideological standpoints, and power resources they
apply and cultivate. In this sense Hyman (HYMAN, 2001) identifies three di erent ideal
types of European trade unionism: Unions with primarily labor market functions, unions
as means of raising workers’ status in society, and unions as proponents of the struggle
between labor and capital.
As graph 3 indicates, all trade unions need to position themselves in between these three
points of reference. The first point of reference, the market implies the regulation of
the wage – labor relationship. Since trade unions represent employees, this is one of their
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Figure 4 – Trade Union Density Sweden, Germany, Italy, France
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main concerns and therefore the market is important. The second, class, means that trade
unions are inevitably agencies of class. The third, society, represents the specific social
framework that constrains trade union’s choices and actions. In Western Europe trade
unions tend to be oriented towards one side of the triangle, meaning that they position
themselves mainly between two points. Each side of the triangle implies its own contra-
dictions.
Figure 4 indicates the trade union density1 in Sweden, Germany, Italy and France from
1960 until 2013. In all four countries trade union density has decreased. However, the
moment trade uniond density went down considerably di ers as well as the extent of the
decrease. The following sections will discuss the developement of the industrial relations
of the four countries.
3.3.1 Industrial relations in Sweden
Swedish industrial relations have been dominated by collective agreements, co-
operation, self-regulation and a combination of centralization and decentralization. The
varieties of trade unionism approach classifies Sweden as a Nordic industrial relations
type with an institutionalized class compromise and a very high level of unionization (see
previous section). Swedish trade unions still possess a very high union density rate (in
2007 73 %). The 1980s and 1990s and 2000s were marked by employers’ o ensives to
undermine trade unions power by reforming union-led unemployment funds.
In Sweden, a very distinctive route to integrative trade unionism was followed. Given
1 Trade union density corresponds to the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union members,
divided by the total number of wage and salary earners (OECD Labour Force Statistics). Density is
calculated using survey data, wherever possible, and administrative data adjusted for non-active and
self-employed members otherwise(OECD, 2017).
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that Sweden was a neutral country in the First World War, the workers movement was
spared the divisions over its position to the First World War, as was the case in the other
European countries. Both the Social Democratic Party (SAP) and the central trade union
confederation (LO) had a close organic relationship. The workers movement was weak well
into the 20th century due to the small industry in the country. The Social Democratic
Party entered into government in 1932 and stayed in government non-stop until 1976.
This continuity explains the development of an extensive welfare state and very stable in-
dustrial relations. Peak level bargaining between the LO and the employers’ organization
SAF 2 were a fundamental part of the industrial relations (HYMAN, 2001, 47). Another
important aspect of Swedish industrial relations is the division between blue-collar trade
unions and white-collar trade unions. White-collar workers possess separate confedera-
tions (SAOC and TCO), making the recruitment for each confederation homogenous.
The basis for the legal framework of the industrial relations was set in the 1930s and
established an extensive collective bargaining system that made state regulations super-
fluous. The main trade union confederation, LO, was very much opposed to the idea of
any state interference in industrial relations. This system proved e ective from the very
start. In 1930 already 80 % of all industrial workers in Sweden were covered by collective
agreements. The LO Sweden started centralizing its structures in the 1940s, depriving
members of voting rights regarding collective agreements. “One aim of centralization was
to curb the influence of communists, who wielded power in LO unions organizing seamen,
paper workers and building workers, all of which were involved in militant wage strug-
gles and labor market conflicts during the depression years of the 1930s” (KJELLBERG,
2009). The extensive autonomy of the trade unions to negotiate the terms under which
workers should work in the labor market can also be seen in the union’s implications in
the guest worker program. As described in the previous section local unions and employers
compromised on how much labor the local economy was in need of.
The LO Sweden opened up more democratic membership participation in the 1970s,
due to pressure from the student movement and from a series of wild strikes at the state
owned mining company LKAB in the years 1969 -1970. More direct negotiations at the
workplace were able to take place and union o cers at local branches were guaranteed
access to workplaces. This was an important right for small workplaces without union
representatives. The 1970s additionally marked a period of a series of labor laws that
were passed by the government to guarantee employment protection. Even though the
labor legislation that was passed meant a departure from the classic Swedish model of
self- regulation, it can still be considered as a continuation of the industrial relations since
most laws were only framework laws that were meant to be implemented by collective
2 SAF (Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen) is the Swedish employer’s organization.
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agreements (KJELLBERG, 2009).
The 1980s and 1990s saw a rise in unemployment and therefore also a decline in trade
union power (see 2.2.3). The Swedish Employers organizations repeatedly called for leg-
islation restricting conflict rights. The largest coup to diminish trade union rights was
however introduced in 2007 with a new law that brought about profound changes in the
unemployment insurance. Union run funds have a long history in Sweden and are an
integral part of the trade union system3 The changes introduced by the center-right gov-
ernment meant that the trade union had to raise their fees considerably. “Large numbers
of members experienced a six fold net increase” (KJELLBERG, 2009). Due to this the
union-led funds lost about 10% of their members.
3.3.2 Industrial relations in Germany
The Industrial relations in Germany are a product of the second half of the twen-
tieth century. As explained in the previous section, the German trade union tradition is
marked by traditions of social partnership and formal tripartite institutions (see 2.1.2).
Trade Unions were seen as forces for social integration and with the duty to avoid the
cleavages that were destructive during the Weimar Republic. Immediately after the end
of the Second World War The BRD – Bundesrepublik Deutschland - was constituted in
the West and the DDR - Deutsche Demokratische Republik – in the East. Given that
the construction of industrial relations in the BRD were relevant for the further develop-
ment of trade unions even after the unification of Germany, I will concentrate on the BRD.
On the trade union side, the principle of trade union unity, meaning a single union in
each workplace was dominant. The German Confederation (DGB) of Trade Unions con-
sisted of several sectorial unions. The unions were largely run by social democrats. In-
dustrial relations in the 1950s and 1960s were dominated by collective bargaining. The
concept of a social market economy persisted and became an equivalent to the idea of
organized capitalism. Part of this concept was the autonomy of unions and employer’s
organizations as bargaining partners. “The Keynnesian compromise in which growth, full
employment and price stability were underwritten by government economic policy estab-
lished the preconditions for sectoral unions to pursue successfully their core bargaining
functions” (HYMAN, 2001, 121).
The late 1960s and 1970s saw a resurgence of class conflict in all of Europe. The BRD
experienced an upsurge in spontaneous strikes, especially against the falling real wages
and the intensification of work pressure. This had consequences for the trade union move-
3 It must be noted that workers can be a liated to a fund and not to a trade union. In 2007every
seventh member of a union-led unemployment fund was not a union member (HYMAN, 2001, 91).
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ment. “A central focus of dissent in many of the disputes was the fact that workplace
productivity coalitions often excluded many sections of the working class: women, mi-
grant workers and the lower- skilled “ (HYMAN, 2001, 124). The reactions of the trade
union leadership to this upsurge were ambivalent. One aspect was to discipline shop-floor
activists that were suspected of communist sympathies. On the other hand trade union
leaders had to demonstrate that they were willing to be tough and radical in order to
avoid being outflanked by workplace militants as a consequence. Wage bargaining was
now accompanied by negotiations about qualitative demands concerning working condi-
tions (HYMAN, 2001).
The 1980s were marked by a sharp decline in trade union members. However, given that
de-industrialization was a lot less marked in Germany, the process of trade unions’ de-
creasing power was felt less sharply than in other countries of Western Europe (HYMAN,
2001, 127). The 1980s nevertheless posed several challenges to industrial relations and
especially to trade unions in Germany. The German trade unions didn’t adapt quickly
to the changing profile of the labor force as a whole and remained predominantly or-
ganizations of male manual workers. During the 1980s, serious scandals were unrolled
surrounding unions’ business activities. The unions’ property agency Neue Heimat4 col-
lapsed spectacularly, damaging the DGB’s public image and esteem. Additionally, there
was deterioration in the labor market and a strong increase in unemployment. While un-
employment had only been around 1 % in the 1970s, it rose to 9 % in 1983. Furthermore
the labor market became polarized between a core workforce and a periphery of lower
skilled workers. The employers adopted a more o ensive strategy and insisted on flexibil-
ity in the work organization pushing the trade unions into a defensive position. The next
marking point of the 1980s was the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The DDR became part
of the BRD resulting in a rapid deindustrialization of Eastern Germany and a surge in
unemployment (16% in 1992). The Eastern trade unions were dissolved and their former
members were encouraged to join the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) which led to
a surge in trade union membership. The problem of the rise in unemployment persisted
throughout most the 1990s. The labor market continued to shift with a rise in tempo-
rary employment and the emergence of the two-labor market with a core labor force and
marginalized workers (HYMAN, 2001). As I argued this can be seen as a neoliberal shift in
Germany and the connected shift in power relations in favor of those in power (see 2.2.4).
By the end of the 1990s the German industrial relations were characterized by fragmen-
tation and heterogeneity. The formal institutions of the traditional system remained in
place but their regulatory e ect had been significantly reduced (HYMAN, 2001, 134).
4 Neue Heimat is the DGB’s property agency. It was a corporate building company owned by the
German Trade Union Confederation. The scandal involved that several leading trade unionists had
enriched themselves through the rents this agency recieved. Additionally it was heavily indepted.
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The emergence of a coalition government between Social Democrats and the Green Party
in 1998 marked yet another turning point. A deputy leader of the metal workers union
IG Metall, Walter Riester, became minister of labor. The government was committed to
several positive actions that the trade unions agreed with. However they did not deliver
on their immediate commitments. It soon turned out the Red-Green government followed
a Tony Blair 3rd way path, further implementing neoliberal policies, tightening budgetary
discipline and “modernizing” the welfare state. This implied far-reaching reforms of the
welfare system, especially concerning unemployment benefits. The so call Hartz IV re-
forms were intended to sanction long- term unemployed unwilling to work. This drastic
reduction for many of the unemployed was accompanied by increased pressure on them
to accept any kind of job o ered. If people refused or were unable to keep up with re-
quirements made by job centers they were threatened with sanctions (The Economist,
2004). Extensive protests followed and led to a split in the Social Democratic party and
to the creation of a new left winged party Die Linke. The mentioned reforms strained
the relationship between trade unions and the Social Democratic party for the following
years. This has been loosened up after the end of the Red-Green government.
3.3.3 Industrial relations in Italy
The Italian industrial relations are part of the Southern European group that
is characterized by ideologically divided labor movements where labor regulation is de-
pended on state legislation. The main trade union confederation Confederazione Generale
Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) was created in 1944 by representatives of the communist, the
socialist and the catholic movements. The trade union movement and the industrial rela-
tions in Italy were thereafter marked by splits within the trade union movement mostly
sparked by di erent approaches to the challenges they were facing.
The initial unity of the trade union movement was only short-lived. The Christian oriented
labor movement (CISL) split o  as well as the social democratic and republican tendencies
(UIL). The CGIL however remained the largest trade union and was closely associated
to the Communist Party which was one of the reasons why the United States strongly
encouraged the mentioned splits in the climate of the Cold War5. In the two decades after
the end of the Second World War, the Italian trade unions possessed a significant public
status. Components of the social insurance system were administered by tripartite boards
and the public sector trade unions participated in a network of regulatory committees.
This implied that the Italian trade unions were embedded as components of the social
order. They mixed anti-capitalist resistance with integrative functions in society. All three
5 However the CGIL was not entirely a liated to the Communist Party. Until the 1991 there were
o cially two currents within the CGIL: Communist and Socialist. The Communists compsed 2/3 of
the CGIL and the Socialists 1/3.
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trade unions were implicated in a series of company agreements that were usually nego-
tiated by full-time o cials (rather than workplace representatives).
The end of the 1960s and the 1970s were marked by an escalation of industrial militancy.
There was broad discontent with conditions of the factory regime, the intensification of
work and the cost of urban living. Even though the o cial confederations had not initi-
ated the revolts, “they rode the strike wave and were its main beneficiary. Membership
increased rapidly: by the late 1970s roughly half of all Italian employees were unionized”
(??)Hyman2001. This increase in membership and in workers’ militancy led to a shift in
the bargaining power of the confederations leading them to negotiate considerable im-
provements for the workers. The bargaining aims even surpassed the narrow realm of the
workplace and included demands such as the costs of housing and transport. Trade unions
added legitimacy to the process of governance.
Towards the end of the 1970s and in the 1980s the power relations changed dramatically.
The Italian economy entered a crisis with high inflation and mounting unemployment. The
Italian trade union developments of the time can be seen as “a strategic shift from class
oppositions to political exchange and social partnership” (HYMAN, 2001, 151). Unions
tried to at least moderate the pace of the erosion of the gains they had reached in the
1970s. The Confederations were pushed in a defensive position. Additionally, the trade
unions were challenged by structural changes in the economy. Declining employment in
the agricultural and the manufacturing sector, where unionization was high meant that it
became harder for them to position themselves as representatives of the Italian working
class as a whole6 Another implication of the crisis of trade unions of the epoch was the
growth of autonomous unions, especially in the public sector.
The 1990s were characterized by corruption scandals, the end of the Soviet Union and
its implications for the Communist movement in Italy and the rise of a right-wing move-
ment. The right-winged populist Silvio Berlusconi established the Forza Italia gained
significance in this decade. Additionally the traditional left block with the Communist
Party was consumed by an identity crisis after the dissolvent of the Soviet Union 7. On
a political level the frequent change in government did not impede neoliberal policies to
take place. Privatizations and liberalizations marked the economic policies of the decade.
This political crisis brought about a rupture between the main three trade union con-
federations and the political parties they were a liated to. Furthermore all trade unions
6 For further information on the composition of the Italian trade unions see (GIANGRANDE, 2016).
7 A right winged coalition under the leadership of Silvio Berlusconi took power in 1994 with a clear
neoliberal agenda. His government only held for mere 8 months. Afterwards a technocratic government
took on power led by Lamberto Dini. New elections eventually brought a center-left coalition to power
leading to a shift in government every two years.
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faced the challenge of their members being pensioners. In 1993, half of the membership of
the CGIL was retired. This also meant that a planned reform of the pension system led
to massive protests and a general strike organized by the trade unions. However, these
mobilizations did not lead to an increase in membership for the trade unions. By the end
of the 1990s, the total membership of the three confederations was only just over half of
the employees of the country (HYMAN, 2001). On a political level the end of the 1990s
saw yet another government led by Silvio Berlusconi. He then came back to power form
2001 until 2006. After losing one election he managed to lead the government yet again
in 2008 (BBC, 2016). Another turning point for Italy’s industrial relations was in 2009
when an agreement was signed that utterly reformed the collective bargaining system to
allow sectorial agreements to be modified at a company level. The CGIL was the only
confederation that did not sign the agreement. “The Berlusconi government had achieved
its declared goal of dividing the unions, at least at the centre” (NAMUTH, 2013, 1).
3.3.4 Industrial relations in France
The French trade union movement as it exists today has its origins at the end of
the Second World War, even though the main trade union CGT was founded in the mid
19th century. Similar to the Italian labor movement, French trade unionism belongs to the
Southern European group which is marked by ideological divisions and labor regulation
that is based on legislation. The French labor movement did not originate in the context
of a large concentrated working class. The rural parts of France were integrated into the
proletariat late, in the 1960s and 1970s. Therefore the working class has been marked
by heterogeneity and by being sociologically mixed. This is one of the reasons why the
trade union movement has never been completely united to represent the working class
as a while (PERNOT, 20210). The state plays an important role in mediating between
the labor movement and employers’ representatives. There are no extensive structures of
negotiation. Therefore the history of the French working class is “an endless chronic of
mobilizations against the employers” (PERNOT, 20210, 6).
After the liberation of France, the Confédération du Travail (CGT) dominated the trade
union movement. The CGT traditionally had close links to the Communist Party of
France. This link was especially strong in the years after the end of the war. The CGT
o cially called for the economic reconstruction of the country. However to prevent there
being too much of an organic relationship with the French Communist Party the CGT
prohibited the accumulation of parliamentary and trade union positions at the same time.
The CGT promoted the idea of “revolutionary trade unionism” (FRÉMINVILLE, 2015).
In line with its ideology the CGT also opposed the Marshall plan that was implemented
by the USA. The trade union confederation practiced confrontational politics with strikes
and street mobilizations being their way of asserting their demands. The strikes of 1947
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brought an increase in salaries of 25% (FRÉMINVILLE, 2015).
The French labor movement experienced its first significant split after the strikes in 1947.
The Force Ouvrière (FO) represented trade unionists that thought the CGT strategy was
too confrontative. Financed by the CIA of the United States the FO was also a means
to weaken communist influence within the French labor movement. The creation of the
CFDT in 1964, was yet another important point in the history of the French trade union
movement. Originally the CFDT came form the Christian labor movement and high-
lighted an approach that was more focused on negotiation. The CFDT has however been
associated with the Socialist Party of France (FRÉMINVILLE, 2015).
In the 1970s the unionization rate was at 20 %. In the 1980s the trade union movement
had already lost half of their members. A turning point of the French industrial relations
came in 1981 when the French Socialists won the presidential elections. This was impor-
tant since the victory of a Socialist Party came as Europe was experiencing an economic
tide that was turning in favor of neoliberal conservatism. It came about through a broad
coalition of the left with the Communist Party and other left-winged parties. “One of
the many unforeseen consequences of the great 1981 victory of the French Left was that
what, at the end of the Second World War, had been the strongest communist party
in Western Europe, had, within the space of a few years, lost over half of its national
electorate and seen the end of its ideological influence”(SASSOON, 2013, 542). The CGT
supported the four Communist ministers that served in the government. However by the
end of the 1980s the CGT had pulled pack its close support and the railway strikes in 1987
once again demonstrated the trade unions’ ability to mobilize and to paralyze the country.
After the dissolvent of the Soviet Union the CGT also entered a period of disorientation.
The other two large trade unions, FO and CFDT, were able to profit o  of this situation.
However the 1990s mark a period where all trade unions started to intentionally distance
themselves form political parties. The large mobilizations of 1995 again demonstrated a
large capacity of mobilizations of the trade union movement. This time the FO and CGT
mobilized together. The beginning of the 2000s saw large struggles against the pension
reform that implied the trade unions (FRÉMINVILLE, 2015). The 2000s additionally saw
significant splits from the CFDT into smaller more combative radical left unions such as
the Solidaires unitaires et democratiques (SUD) that have ever since been part of the
trade union movement.
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3.4 Trade Unions and Migration – a contradictory relationship?
This section analyses the relationship between trade unions and migrants. The
first item will summarize the current literature on European trade unions and migrants.
It will describe common dynamics that exist for European trade unions when dealing
with immigration. The following sections will go into the four countries of interest to this
thesis. An account of the main changes that have happened in the trade union strategies
and positions towards immigrants will be discussed.
The last thirty years of neoliberal governance have led to an enormous concentration of
wealth and, at the same time, workforces are facing increasingly precarious circumstances.
The challenges trade unions of the Global North face are similar: Growing inequality, the
growth of low-wage non-union workforces, the inability of unions to speak with a coher-
ent voice on behalf of all workers and a growing demonization of foreigners, especially
Muslims. Trade unions have an essential role to play in a successful mobilization against
concentrated economic and political power. Immigrant workers occupy a central position
in the low-wage workforce and therefore trade unions play a key role in the struggle for
their rights. Precarious workforces include large numbers of vulnerable immigrant workers
everywhere in the Global North. “The availability of low-wage immigrant labor has given
employers a strengthened hand to push for freer labor markets and weaker unions, to
play groups of workers o  against each other, to fragment the collective cohesion and bar-
gaining power of workers and their organizations of representation” (TURNER, 2014, 8).
Furthermore, the challenges many trade unions of the Global North face are the di cul-
ties to organize and advocate for immigrants are similar. Most trade unions have therefore
recognized the changing workforce realities and have changed their o cial policies. Most
unions have also given up their restrictive stance on immigration and have adopted policies
that recognize immigrants above all as workers in need of representation and organization.
Low wage work8 has expanded in all of the Global North and immigrant workers are
more likely to end up in low-wage work than native-born workers. Additionally precari-
ous work has expanded (see 2.2.1) and immigrants are also more likely to be exposed to
this kind of work. Similarly, inequality (measured in the GINI coe cient) has risen in the
entire Global North.
At the same time union membership has decreased in most countries of the Global North.
International competition has weakened unions in their manufacturing strongholds where
jobs and production are mobile. “Thus the mirror image confronting unions in today’s
world markets: if good jobs in manufacturing can flee the Global North, many of the
8 The o cial definition of low wage work by the OCED is a earning less than two thirds of the median
earnings of employees in an economy.
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remaining jobs can be populated by immigrant workers in precarious circumstances that
allow employers to keep labor standards down“ (AVENDAÑO et al., 2014, 19). Therefore
trade unions should have enough incentive to organize migrants and to turn to them as
part of the low-wage work force that they need to organize and support. The trade union’s
stance towards immigration and migrants is important since they “are likely to a ect the
position of migrant workers within the labor market and within society“ (MARINO et
al., 2015, 1). However, trade union representation of migrants still remains relatively low.
In all countries of the Global North the unionization rate of migrants is lower than that
of native-workers. There are several explanations as to why this is the case.
Pennix and Roosblad (PENNINX; ROOSBLAD, 2002) have identified 3 main contra-
dictions that trade unions of the Global North face on the issue of migration: The first
one is resisting immigration versus cooperating, the second excluding immigrants as mem-
bers versus including then and the third being providing equal versus special treatment.
Most trade unions have solved the first two contradictions, not resisting immigration and
acknowledging it as a fact. What remains is the third contradiction, which involves how
to organize and support migrants in what way (AVENDAÑO et al., 2014). A reason why
the unionization of immigrants is low is also due to the labor market position migrants
occupy. Unskilled, precarious and informal work relations are areas in which migrants are
highly represented and these parts of the labor market have always been weak in terms
of trade union activities.
From the migrant workers point of view it could be assumed that there are high in-
centives to join trade unions. Unions have three functions when it comes to organizing
and representing labor migrants: representing the interests of immigrants as workers in
order to improve their working conditions, providing immigrants with access to politi-
cal participation and providing them with services that improve their living conditions.
Therefore joining a union seems worthwhile for migrants themselves even though there
are di culties such as language and cultural di erences (MARINO et al., 2015).
However, some trade unions are more inclined than others to reach out towards migrant
workers. There is significant research that suggests that trade unions whose member-
ship power has declined significantly have opened up more towards migrants. Addition-
ally, institutional entrenchment into government structures (as is the case for German
trade unions) generally leads to a less inclusive attitude towards migrants. Institutional
power seems to reduce the necessity of trade unions to reach out towards more marginal-
ized groups. Another reason is that a single dominant union confederation that holds a
monopoly position enjoys greater organizational security and therefore has fewer incen-
tives to organize migrant workers. Competing union confederations are more willing to
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recruit migrant workers as a means of gaining organizational strength at their rivals’ ex-
pense (MARINO et al., 2015)(GORODZEISKY; SEMYONOV, 2015).
“As neoliberal economic governance proves unsustainable, revitalized unions and their
allies weigh in powerfully on the side of fundamental policy transformation in the drive
for an inclusive, sustainable society” (AVENDAÑO et al., 2014, 13). Given that union
membership can be seen as a critical means for migrant workers to exercise an impor-
tant range of social rights, migrants incorporation into trade unions is a strong indicator
of their incorporation into the host countries societies (GORODZEISKY; SEMYONOV,
2015). Additionally it is important to keep in mind that decisions of trade unions to ei-
ther exclude or represent migrants and how to represent and support migrants are on the
one hand influenced by dynamics in society. Nevertheless, unions’ decisions are not only
influenced by external factors. Trade Unions do possess a degree of independence in their
choices (MARINO; ROOSBLAD, 2008).
3.4.1 Trade union positions towards migrants in Sweden
As described in chapter 1 (see 2.1.1 and 2.2.3) the fordist migration regimes and
for some part the neoliberal migration regime in Sweden was marked by strong union
participation in migration policies. Trade unions de facto had control over immigration
policies in Sweden. Since there has been a decline in union power and corporatism in
Sweden, there were consequences for migration policies. Right-winged and liberal forces
were able to push through their agenda more easily (BJÖRG; CERNA, 2015).
During the fordist migration regime and the beginning of the neoliberal migration regime,
trade union confederations in Sweden had exceptional influence on migration policies.
There was little room for other actors on the labor market to influence migration policies
as well as ideological positions of political parties. The strong link between the Social
Democratic Party (SAP), the trade union confederation LO and the Swedish National
Labor Market Board (AMS) added institutional strength to the trade unions. In general
the main trade union LO was supported by the other confederations, TCO and SACO, in
positions towards immigration policies. “For a long time, Swedish unions enjoyed de facto
veto power over labour immigration” (BJÖRG; CERNA, 2015). The LO had managed to
pose heavy conditions on the recruitment of foreign workers. It was clear that immigrant
workers should have the same standards as Swedes in terms of housing, education and
social benefits. To execute this, the LO was able to deny work permits to immigrants. If
employers failed to meet union standards on pay or working conditions the trade union
confederation LO would deny them work permits for the immigrant workers they desired.
Hereby the LO ensured that immigrant workers had equal working and wage conditions as
native workers. This functioned as a guarantee that wages would not be undercut. These
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strict standards were pushed through and secured by the “iron triangle” of the LO, the
Social Democratic Party SAP and the Labor Market Board AMS.
The immigration laws that started to restrict labor immigration were contested by the
employers’ association of the private sector, SAF, but they were not able to push through
their interests against the “iron triangle” of the LO, SAP and AMS. For this reason labor
migration constituted the smallest percentage of all migration types in the 1970s (see
2.1.1). In 1985 Swedish trade union density reached its peak with an organization rate of
85 %. During the beginning of the neoliberal migration regime, trade unions were able to
form strong alliances around labor immigration, with blue-collar and white-collar unions
and political parties and government agencies. The trade unions were therefore able to
influence the conditions under which labor immigration took place. However, in the 2000s
the trade unions had their influence over particularly the issue of labor migration dimin-
ished considerably.
Given the decline in trade union density, the alliances created around labor immigra-
tion became weaker and lost its force in the 2000s. Even though trade union density is
still high when compared to other European countries and when compared to the other
countries of interest to this thesis, for the Swedish context the LO’s unionization rate
has gone down considerably. In 2008 union density rate (for all three union confedera-
tions) was 77%, compared to 85% in 1994. Among the three trade union confederations
in Sweden, LO was particularly hard hit by the loss in members. The alliance between
the three trade union confederations also diminished. The two confederations TCO and
SACO took up more liberal positions towards labor migration and therefore undermined
the strict stance of the LO-Sweden. An important turning point of labor immigration
in Sweden was the enlargement of the European Union in 2004. Sweden was one of the
countries that allowed citizens of the new member states access to its labor market. This
was pushed through against the will of the LO and of the SAP. The Social Democrats
did not receive a majority in the parliament to restrict access to the labor market for the
new member states.
In chapter 1 (see 2.2.3) I argue that the context of the new migration law that was
passed in 2008 presented yet another marking point. This law represents a form of man-
aged migration in Sweden: It was introduced by the center right government with support
from the Greens, and was primarily aimed at expanding labor immigration. It identified
employers as being best suited to understand their own recruitment needs and it trans-
ferred the authority for processing cases involving resident and work permits from the
Swedish public labor market authorities to the Swedish Migration Board. This addition-
ally represented the undermining of trade unions’ influence on labor migration issues.
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Labor migration had been kept to a minimum before and was under close supervision of
the trade unions. This new law, that reflects the interests of employers, is clearly a con-
sequence of a shift in power relations in Swedish society. “Since the new law has entered
into force, some claim that the unions’ role is reduced to that of toothless consultation.
More specifically, unions could be asked for their advice and approval in some cases of
influence, but not in every work permit case”(BJÖRG; CERNA, 2015).
The new law was introduced in the midst of a global economic crisis. Trade unions have
built alliances with employers in accepting labor migration and have tried to set salary
levels and working conditions, given that the flows of immigrants could not be stopped
with restrictive policies. The Swedish trade union confederations, especially the LO Swe-
den, has realized that changing the immigration laws in a liberal manner will help unions’
e orts to organize immigrants and to diminish their precarious economic and legal sit-
uation. Restrictive immigration policies lead to a more precarious situation of migrants
themselves (BJÖRG; CERNA, 2015).
The Swedish trade unions have taken clear stances towards the refugee crisis. An ex-
ample of this is a petition signed with the Council of the Nordic Trade Unions9 that call
for the establishment of asylum seekers in the Nordic labor markets with faire conditions.
They argue for the shortening of the validation process for education and to encourage
language training for asylum seekers. The petition calls on the social partner to find so-
lutions for entrance of refugees into the labor market (??). The LO Sweden’s positions
towards refugees similarly focus strongly on their labor market integration. Therefore
their contact with asylum seekers that are not part of the labor market is very limited.
The LO has opened an o ce for undocumented migrants that seeks to give advice on
labor rights. A LO o cial said: “We do not organize them because they are refugees, we
organize them because they are workers” (KARRAS; MORINA, 2016, 32). Even though
the asylum seekers and refugees have a relatively easy access to the Swedish labor market,
when compared to other European countries, they still face many obstacles when trying
to find a job. Given that it is not possible to even join the LO Sweden as an unemployed
person, the possibilities for the LO to reach the group of refugees is more limited since
their unemployment rate is higher than for everyone else. In public statements the LO
Sweden has however made an e ort to accentuate refugee rights (KARRAS; MORINA,
2016). Similar to the German discussion, the Swedish employers’ organization has sug-
gested lowering the minimum wage for refugees and asylum seekers in order to facilitate
their entry into the labor market. The LO Sweden is strictly against this and proposes
more language classes and e ective access to labor market services for refugees and asy-
9 The Council of the Nordic Trade Unions is a regional trade union confederation. Its members are 16
national trade union confederations from Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Greenland and
the Faroe Islands.
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lum seekers (FRIC; AUMAYR-PINTAR, 2016).
The Swedish trade union LO was historically marked by having strong influence over
migration policies, especially concerning the labor market. Together with the “iron tri-
angle” the LO was able to control labor migration into the country and to control the
conditions under which immigrants were employed. With decreasing union density, the
LO also lost some of it’s control over migration policies in Sweden. While the LO’s po-
sition towards immigration was to opt for a highly restrictive labor migration, the LO’s
position changed in the 2000s also due to the di ering power relations on the country.
The LO shifted their position away from trying to restrict labor migration towards a po-
sition that is in favor of immigration but under certain circumstances. Currently the LO
is still discussing how to reach out towards refugees and asylum seekers. By opening up
an o ce for undocumented workers the LO Sweden is clearly recognizing that this group
of immigrant workers is an important group that needs to be focused on.
3.4.2 Trade union positions towards migrants in Germany
The German case is marked by the power, influence and organizational status
trade unions achieved in rebuilding the country of Western Germany. As I argued (see
3.3.2), trade unions were seen as forces for social integration and with the duty to avoid
the cleavages that were destructive during the Weimar Republic. In the immediate post-
war period trade unions were willing to integrate a growing number of immigrants at the
workplace. Given that migrant workers were mostly based in the industrial heartland,
this was also a part of the economy where trade unions were powerful. Trade unions
therefore aided in the integration of migrants into the workplace. However, it must be
noted that migrants, mostly unskilled, were recruited to do the worst paid jobs. “Most
migrants, independent of their skill level, were contracted to do the low-paying, hardest,
and dirtiest jobs; however, German unions ensured that these workers were covered by
their collective agreements and were paid according to the same contractual standards as
German workers” (AVENDAÑO et al., 2014, 87).
During the guest worker migration regime in Germany the predominant idea was that
the recruited workers would leave as soon as their employers were not in need of them
anymore. The highly organized recruitment programs were regulated by bilateral agree-
ments between Germany and the sending countries (see 2.1.2). The German trade union’s
stance towards migration in this period was marked by the dominant migration regime of
the time. They subscribed to the economic benefits resulting from organized migration.
However, on the shop floor tensions persisted between trade union members and o cials
and migration workers. The governing mechanisms of works councils and codetermina-
tion were not fit to represent migrant workers. Language barriers and specific concerns of
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migrant workers had to be addressed by trade unions. The reform of the Works Constitu-
tion Act, which was revised in the mid 1960s permitted non-Germans to run for positions
in the Works Council. This gave new impetus to trade union involvement with migrant
workers (AVENDAÑO et al., 2014).
The guest worker recruitment programs o cially stopped in 1973, however migration
to Germany continued through a di erent legal channel. During the first phase of the
neoliberal migration regime in Germany, family reunification was the main means of en-
trance for many migrants (see 2.2.4). Additionally there was a rise in xenophobia within
the German society. Trade Unions in Germany o cially harshly condemned the racist
attacks of the 1980s and 1990s but the trade union confederation DGB also gave contra-
dictory messages. The DGB was in favor of characterizing migrations as a reserve labor
that should come second to German workers. German workers should have the right to
a job before a migrant worker is considered for the job. When it came to positioning
themselves to concrete legislative measures the DGB opposed the limitation of family re-
union rights and opposed the expansion of causes for expulsion (AVENDAÑO et al., 2014).
The 1990s and 2000s saw, on the one hand a substantial shift in the migration policies
and patterns and a shift in the labor market. As argued (see 2.2.4) managed migration
became a dominant form of migration paired with asylum migration. However asylum
migration was paired with negative attributes and was increasingly restricted. Addition-
ally unemployment had risen to 9 % in 1983. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989
a rapid deindustrialization of Eastern Germany took place resulting in a further surge
in unemployment (16% in 1992). The labor market became polarized between the core
workforce and a periphery of lower skilled workers, posing a challenge to trade unions
(see 2.2.4). The rise in these types of a-typical work, in which migrants were typically
employed, cemented the pay gap between migrant workers and German workers. Even
though union contracts ensured equal pay, these segments of the labor market were not
incorporated in trade union agreements. Germany did not have a minimum wage and
therefore the segments of the economy where trade union representation was weak or
non-existent did not profit from collective agreements. The low-wage workforce increased
form the mid-1990s up to 20.8 % in 2004, one of the highest across continental Europe.
The so-called mini-jobs, a new form of precarious, a-typical employment were considered
one of the main drivers for the expansion of low wage work (AVENDAÑO et al., 2014, 18).
With the enlargement of the European Union in 2004, the DGB supported the seven
year ban on the freedom of movement of persons from these countries. In reality the seven
year ban did not lessen the presence of foreign workers from Eastern European countries in
Germany, it just mainly caused a further division of working conditions and pay between
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migrant workers and German workers. Additionally the rise in xenophobia and racism
has also been a problem for trade unions internally. A high-level Commission on far right
extremism within the DGB was launched in 2000 and found that the attitudes of trade
union members mirror those of society as a whole. Alarmingly the report found “no evi-
dence of the existence of a trade union belief system in the membership” (AVENDAÑO et
al., 2014, 95). Due to this there have been several campaigns by trade union federations,
such as the metal union IG Metall campaign Respekt!, countering racism. There have,
however, also been more concrete steps taken towards migrant workers from trade unions.
One of these has been the united campaign of all sectorial trade unions for a minimum
wage. The minimum wage, which was recently introduced (in 2015), will foremost help
workers in a-typical employment conditions and therefore many migrant workers. There
have additionally been several examples where trade unions have concretely struggled for
the rights of migrant workers. One example is the services union Verdi that helped an
illegalized au pair in Hamburg fight for wages that had not been paid (AVENDAÑO et
al., 2014). However, Ver.di also refused membership to a group of refugees in 2013 and the
DGB Brandenburg-Berlin called the police to evict a group of refugees from their premise
that were demanding trade union membership (BERGFELD, 2017).
All in all the German trade union’s approaches towards immigrants has been contradic-
tory. This is equally reflected in their approach towards the current refugees. As discussed
in chapter 1(see 2.3.5), German society initially reacted towards the refugees arriving in
Germany with a Willkommenskultur, meaning a civil society movement welcoming the
arriving immigrants. An estimated 10.9 % of the population has been involved in vol-
untary work with refugees. I also described the downside of this movement with the far
right party, AfD, gaining strength with a xenophobic rhetoric. Over 1000 asylum seekers
homes have been attacked. Within this societal context, the DGB and several sectorial
trade unions in Germany have led anti racist campaigns geared primarily towards their
members.
Additionally, the trade unions in Germany have strongly focused on the labor mar-
ket integration of refugees. These positions “reduce refugees. . . to their labour power”
(BERGFELD, 2017, 82). The trade unions accept the government’s migration and asy-
lum policies and propose improvements within the given framework. The unions do not
criticize Germany’s exclusionary migration and asylum policy for people of certain coun-
tries, such as Afghanistan 10 . This “is a product of the trade unions’ traditions role and
persistent self-image as a social partner in a tripartite corporatist system” (BERGFELD,
2017, 83). This “refugee corporatism” implicates that the focus of trade union demands
10 Bergfeld calls this „logic of optimisation“ (BERGFELD, 2017, 86).
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that concern immigrants are about their integration into the labor market 11 . Trade
unions struggle against a further segmentation of the labor market and are therefore keen
on shaping labor market policies that a ect refugees. At the same time several sectorial
trade unions, such as the IG Metall, have opened an information and advice bureau, which
services to asylum seekers and migrants in questions regarding housing and employment.
It is clear that trade union attitudes towards immigrants has changed in the since 2000.
However, the actions of the German trade unions rest confined within the limits given by
the government. This has to do with the role that was attributed to trade unions by the
end of the Second World War. While the DGB as well as sectorial unions have opened up
service centers that cater to the needs of refugees and immigrants, there has not been a
nation-wide campaign advocating for their rights.
3.4.3 Trade union positions towards migrants in Italy
The Italian trade union movement has been marked by struggles for the legal-
ization of illegalized migrants. The labor movement has acknowledged that restrictive
immigration policies do not impede migrants from coming to Italy but merely further
increase the informal economy. It was argued in the first chapter of this thesis that unions
within an industrial relations system categorized as “antagonistic such as the Mediter-
ranean one” tend to have more inclusive policies towards migrants and put more e ort into
organizing, recruiting and integrating immigrant workers. Traditional communist unions
have typically excluded the notion of organizing immigrants through specific and sepa-
rate bodies. The Italian labor movement and especially the Italian trade unions however
have displayed an “unusual inclusive attitude. . . towards early immigrants” (MARINO;
ROOSBLAD, 2008, 630). Immigrants were never conceived as a threat to native workers.
As discussed earlier, migration in Italy has always been closely linked to domestic work.
Migrants from the South of the country to the North worked as domestic workers and
the first waves of foreign workers that came to Italy were mostly women from the former
colonies that were also employed as domestic workers (see 2.2.5). Given that illegalized
immigration to Italy plays a large role in the immigration patterns and also in the trade
union strategies towards migration, it is worth describing this dynamic as it presents it-
self today. A significant number of irregular migrants are employed as domestic workers,
taking care of children, the elderly and performing other domestic services. This system
of care services is largely performed by women and has led to the “growth of an informal
welfare system in which waged immigrant women enter Italian families, [...], to help them
carry out the many tasks socially assigned to women” (AMBROSINI, 2013, 361). Families
11 There is widespread knowledge about the fact that Germany is experiencing a labor shortage and is
therefore in need of labor force(BERGFELD, 2017)
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as employers are therefore one of the main sources of attraction for labor migration into
Italy. Irregular migrants are willing to undertake the hard work with the advantage of
having board and lodging and will accept wages that are a ordable for Italian middle
and working class families. “An irregular migrant costs less, is more flexible and makes
fewer demands” (AMBROSINI, 2013, 363). There is an unwritten rule “of generalized
tolerance” for illegalized domestic workers, meaning that they are rarely deported and
have a relatively good chance of being regularized after some time.
The CGIL, the trade union confederation that is of interest to this thesis, has a relatively
weak ability to influence other social partners. As explained earlier on in this chapter
(see 3.3.3) CGIL is not integrated into government structures the same way the Swedish
and German trade unions are. This means that CGIL has more di culty obtaining im-
provements to immigration laws and the employment conditions of immigration workers
(MARINO; ROOSBLAD, 2008). However, immigrant’s problems and specific challenges
are always present.
As discussed (see 2.2.5), Italy is a relatively new immigration country. Foreign immi-
gration to Italy started in the early 1970s and was always characterized by illegalized
migration. The employment of undocumented migrants is concentrated in certain sectors
such as domestic labor, care work, construction and agriculture. The foreign workers’
participation rate in the labor market is relatively high (at 73,7%) while that of natives
is 57,9%. The unemployment rate of foreigners in Italy is at 8,6% while that of natives is
a t 6,7% (2007). This means that immigration to Italy is strongly linked to job seeking
(MARINO; ROOSBLAD, 2008).
The CGIL has been critical of restrictive immigration laws, such as the Bossi - Fini
Law, that links a residence permit to a labor contract (see 2.2.5). As explained earlier,
one of CGIL’s main concerns is the increase in illegalized migration that they see as be-
ing promoted by restrictive immigration policies such as the Bossi-Fini Law. The CGIL,
together with the other trade union confederations CISL and UIL, participated in initia-
tives and demonstrations, acting as a pressure group towards the government and local
administrations in several cases.
In Italy trade unions have set up assistance in forms of front o ces that give advice and
consultation on the regularizations of residence and work and gaining access to housing
and public services. However, the CGIL does not actively recruit or organize immigrants
(MARINO; ROOSBLAD, 2008). The CGIL in particular has created a specific o ce to
deal with immigrant issues, the U ci immigrati, that provides services without asking for
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a union card 12. This is the connecting channel between the CGIL and immigrant workers.
When the CGIL does recruit migrant workers, it is mostly through this structure. Another
reason for this is that immigrant workers are often employed in sectors with scarce union
presence and are rarely in contact with the sectorial unions on a shop floor level.
There are however exceptions. The metal workers union branch of the CGIL, the FIOM-
CGIL, has the structure of the coordinamento migranti, set up originally by migrant
workers in the metal sector. The coordinamento migranti serves as coordination for trade
unionists to promote initiatives, internal union debate and to influence policy making of
the CGIL itself. This structure does not have any formal role in the decision-making pro-
cess within the trade union but it serves as an important reference point when it comes
to migrant issues. Similarly the Agricultural Federation of the CGIL, the FLAI, has var-
ious experiences organizing immigrants that work in the agricultural sector. (MARINO;
ROOSBLAD, 2008).
In general it can be said that Italian trade unions are able to enter into contact with
migrant workers and integrate their interests with those of natives. Italy has a high
unionization rate among immigrant workers and foreign trade unionists are elected at
workplaces and in the higher positions within the union. The CGIL has put a stronger
focus on building up relations with migrant workers as potential members. In this sense
the CGIL provides migrants with “secondary political participation” (MARINO; ROOS-
BLAD, 2008).
The Italian trade union movement, especially the CGIL has been actively involved in
facilitating the labor market access for refugees. They are providing information for newly
arriving migrants, particularly through o ces that are dedicated to topics relating to im-
migration. Decent working condition for migrants is one of the main issues concerning the
CGIL especially due to segmented labor market. The CGIL is especially engaged in pro-
viding information and assistance to refugees, asylum seekers and other migrants. They
also advocate for safe routes for migrants and they are opposed to the EU - Turkey deal
(see 2.3.3.3) and are in favor of an internal EU resettlement plan. Additionally the CGIL
has been actively supporting movements that struggle for migrants and refugee’s rights
(CGIL, 2017).
Italy’s trade union CGIL has been focusing on illegalized immigrants for the last two
decades. They have been advocating for more possibilities to enter into a legal status due
to large informal sector that exists in the country and that trade unions in general have
12 However it is important to note that the U ci immigrati is not the only means of contact the CGIL
has with immigrants. Particularly the Federations of the CGIL have organized immigrants.
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little access to. The positions and actions of the CGIL have included actively partici-
pating in immigrant rights movements and setting up supportive front o ces. The last
decade are marked by an even stronger involvement in migrants struggles, also due to the
increased visibility of immigrant movements.
3.4.4 Trade union positions towards migrants in France
The French trade union’s approaches and strategies towards migrants are marked
by the trade union landscape with competing national confederations. This has at times
played to the interests of immigrant workers, as unions compete for membership and in-
fluence. At the same time, organizational rivalries have often stood in the way of cohesive
strategies and comprehensive campaigns to organize and integrate immigrants. The de-
mands and struggles of immigrants and trade unions have always targeted the state as
well as employers.
For most of the fordist migration regime and during the time of foreign labor recruitment,
trade union policies were largely protectionist. Trade unions positions and approaches to-
wards immigrant workers changed after the strikes of 1968, where migrant workers played
a key role. In 1974 the two largest trade union confederations CFDT and CGT issued
a joint declaration of solidarity with immigrant workers. Another turning point was the
major strikes in 1975 and 1983 in the automobile industry. Both strikes were led by mi-
grant workers and supported by the CGT and CFDT.
In the 1980s immigrant struggles shifted their focus towards society. Civil society organi-
zations were founded such as the organization SOS racism that then started leading the
struggles and movements for immigrant rights and against racism. Schools, churches and
communities became important places of struggle and organizing. Trade unions ceased to
play a leading role in these movements given that they were not based in the workplace,
even though trade unionists were active in them (TURNER, 2014).
A central component of inequality within French society is the expansion of a low-wage
immigrant workforce, often in an irregular situation. However within a European context,
France has a rather low incidence of low-wage workers (12%) and the share actually de-
clined from the 1990s to 2007. One of the main reasons for this is France’s high minimum
wage that has been indexed to inflation as well as to the growth of overall productiv-
ity. This trend has been, however, reversed by in the Sarkozy era (2007 -2012) and the
economic crisis that started in 2008. France’s labor market is deeply segmented, with
foreign-born workers more likely to be part of the precarious workforce than native work-
ers.
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As argued (see 2.2.6), one of the features of the neoliberal migration regime are undoc-
umented migrants. While it used to be a phase many migrants accepted before entering
a legalized situation, the neoliberal migration regimes o ered less and less possibilities
for the regularization of sans papiers. The trade union strategy towards and with mi-
grants had lost momentum in the 1980s as immigrant rights movements shifted towards
a broader social focus. This changed again in the mid 2000s. The CGT engaged in e orts
to address low wages and poor working conditions and to demand regularizations. The
main breakthrough and shift in the CGT approach came when the trade union confeder-
ation engaged in a cross-sectorial strike led by illegalized immigrants. The demands did
not only include wages and working conditions but also insisted that employers support
the work permit applications of individual workers. This strike movement also opened
up union membership for current or former undocumented workers. The main action was
concentrated in the capital, Paris. In France the trade union CGT has been the most
active in the recent migrant movements 13. Separate union structures for immigrants do
not exist in the French trade unions. “As unions respond to the demands of immigrant
workers in precarious workforces, we find a recurrent tension between the need to provide
services to individuals and e orts to mobilize workers in collective action” (TURNER,
2014, 79).
The two strikes that were organized mainly by the CGT, therefore mark a main shift
in trade union attitudes towards immigrants. The first strike movement in 2008, L’act
I, brought immigrant workers into the center of organizing e orts. The campaign was
mostly concentrated in the restaurant sector and led to about 2000 regularizations and
an equal number of new union members for the CGT. The strikes in 2009- 2010, l’act
II, in which the CGT joined a coalition of trade unions and NGOs “was a breakthrough
that garnered broad labor and social support, including both workplace-based and civil
society organizations” (TURNER, 2014, 81). This movement brought the trade unions
into new arenas of the precarious workforce, including domestic services and temporary
work. This time about 6000 undocumented workers went on a public strike, occupying
their workplace. The outcome of this strike was less of a clear victory. Even though many
improvements were fought through, all those on strike were not automatically regularized.
Both strikes meant that thousands of undocumented workers emerged form the shadows
into the public arena (BARRON et al., 2011).
The strikes took place while the conservative president Sarkozy, who especially targeted
the Muslim population in France, was in o ce fostering anti-immigrant sentiment. The
ban on burkas that went into e ect in 2011, was an example of how the government
13 The CFDT has been more hesitant and the FO has openly criticized the CGT’s approach and concen-
trated on more individual struggles of illegalized workers. In all three trade unions immigrant workers
have risen to positions of union leadership.
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advanced anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim attitudes14. In light of this political context
however, due to the strikes, the CGT together with a coalition of other trade unions and
civil society organizations15, became the main negotiating partner for the government
when it came to immigration policies.
The far right party Front National (FN) approached near 20 % in the 2012 elections.
In the 2017 elections their candidate, Le Pen, managed to get into the final round. Anti-
immigration rhetoric has been part of her campaign. The trade unions have been at the
forefront of anti racist campaigns by insisting on the inclusive integration of immigrant
workers as French workers and citizens (or future citizens). This can be felt until today.
During the last presidential elections the CGT campaigned heavily against the anti im-
migration rhetoric of the FN candidate. In leaflets that the CGT published (CGT, 2017)
they accentuate the fact the immigrants are an essential part of the workforce. They even
argue that immigrants have a positive e ect on the labor market and are in no way re-
sponsible for unemployment. Concerning refugees, the CGT has underlined its solidarity
with victims of the war and has refused the distinction between “real refugees” and those
that are considered not to be (CGT, 2017). The shift in the CGT approach to immigrants
was marked by the strikes. The trade union began playing a leading role as organizers
of immigrant social movements. Additionally the CGT engaged in a coalition with civil
society organizations demanding the regularization of illegalized immigrants. In the anti-
racist campaigns that CGT has continued to accentuate that immigrants are part of the
workforce. This is a shift that can be traced by to the strikes of 2008.
3.5 Conclusion of Chapter 3
This chapter has given an overview of the labor movements in Western Europe,
particularly in Italy, Germany, France and Sweden. It was showed that the di erent or-
ganization of industrial relations in the four countries has had consequences for the trade
union traditions and modes of action.
In the first section of this chapter, as a conceptual landmark, it was briefly described
the main thoughts of Keynes on unemployment. Keynes argues against neoclassical the-
ories and states that the market does not regulate itself alone. Government intervention
is needed. Unemployment, understood by the author as a moral problem, results of the
normal function of capitalist economies, as money plays an important role. The trade
unions in Western Europe have developed di erent approaches to trying to influence the
14 Roughly 2000 women in France wore a Burka at the time the law entered into force and still continue
to do so(TURNER, 2014, 73).
15 This coalition, that was formed for the strike movement l’act II, was called collectif des onze since it
was a coalition of eleven di erent organizations
76
government and the labor market and in trying to keep unemployment at a minimum. I
have re-narrated the studies that have been conducted concerning the supposed impact of
migration to the labor market. The main finding is that migration is not a game changer
on the labor market. Similar conclusions have been made by studies that consider the cur-
rent migration dynamics in Europe and the labor market. International Organizations,
especially, have promoted the outcome that the current “migration crisis” in Europe will
in itself not have a negative impact on wages or the labor market in general.
The Southern industrial relations have a history of ideologically divided labor movements.
Labor regulations are depended more on legislation and less on collective bargaining and
management from trade union sides. The industrial relations are highly politicized. For
the Italy this meant that the CGIL, even though it is the largest and most influential
trade union confederation, still is exposed to competition from other trade union confed-
erations. The CGIL was closely associated to the Communist Party and the disintegration
of the Soviet Union, paired with corruption scandals, therefore also had dire consequences
for the trade union. The CGIL’s positions and action towards immigrants have also been
highly politicized. It has opened up front o ces for immigrants and has opened up in-
ternal structures that are responsible for specific concerns of migrants. Additionally, the
CGIL is active in immigrant rights movements. The last decade has seen a strong focus
of the CGIL on these movements. The French labor movement is also classified as being
part of the group of Southern industrial relations. Similar to the CGIL in Italy, the CGT
is the largest and most influential trade union in France and has historically been close
to the Communist Party. After the Communist Party participated in a governing coali-
tion in the 1980s, the CGT entered a crisis in which it started distancing itself stronger
from the Communist Party. The CGT’s involvement in immigrant struggles and migrants
rights has historically been strongly workplace oriented. A major shift happened when
the CGT organized strikes of illegalized immigrants, making the topic of migration a
stronger focus within the organization. The industrial relations of the central European
group are marked by long established traditions of social partnership and tripartite insti-
tutions. Trade unions are incorporated in policy making and administration. In Germany
the DGB, the German Confederation of Trade Unions, has been marked by unity. The
welfare state of Western Germany enabled the DGB to participate in the management of
the labor market. The fragmentation of the labor market and the decline in union mem-
bership in the 1980s and 1990s mean a decline in the DGBs strength in society. The DGB
has had a contradictory relationship towards immigrants. At times the DGB has opted
in favor or restricting migration, such as was the case after the EU enlargement. How-
ever there have also been cases of where the trade unions (more on a sectorial basis with
Ver.di and IG Metall) have reached out towards migrants and have actively participated
in the struggle for their rights. This has certainly marked a shift in their approach. The
77
Nordic industrial relations are based on an institutionalized class compromises and high
levels of unionization. The voluntary unemployment systems are managed by the unions
themselves. The Swedish trade union LO therefore directly participates in the regulation
of the labor market. This same dynamic can be found in the trade union approaches to-
wards migration. The LO Sweden was managed labor migration into Sweden for several
decades. The LO Sweden’s role and positions started to change when their trade union
membership decreased and with it their power in society. This inclined the LO Sweden to
leave their position on trying to keep labor migration to a minimum behind. Instead the
LO Sweden is trying to negotiate the terms under which migration is allowed to happen.
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4 Conclusion
The research question of this thesis is if the positions of trade unions in Europe
towards immigrants have changed since the 2000s. I have chosen a comparative perspec-
tive of four countries: Italy, Germany, France and Sweden. Given that these four countries
are part of Western Europe there are similarities between them. A more profound anal-
ysis however makes it clear that there are also significant di erences between the four
countries. This has had e ects on the trade union’s attitudes and actions towards im-
migrants. A historical analysis of the migration regimes, the industrial relations and the
trade unions positions towards migrants have allowed me to scrutinize the changes that
have taken place in the trade union’s positions towards immigrants. It is clear that trade
unions in all four countries have changed their position towards migrants in the last fifteen
years. They have all taken steps towards immigrants. However, there are considerable dif-
ferences between the trade unions in how much of a change has taken place and to what
extent they consider immigration and issues of immigrants as important topics. While
discussing the trade unions of Italy, Germany, France and Sweden I chose to concentrate
in the CGIL in Italy, on the CGT in France, on the DGB in Germany and on the LO in
Sweden.
The fordist migration regimes in Western Europe were marked by the o cial recruit-
ment of immigrant workers. This was essential for the economic development after 1945.
In Sweden the industrial relations after the end of the Second World War were charac-
terized by collective bargaining systems and by a high union density. Given the close
relationship between the trade union LO and the Social Democratic Party, the LO had
significant influence on policy making. The LO had extensive autonomy for governing the
labor market and determining the working conditions of the country. During the guest
worker regime, the Swedish government recruited foreign workers, mainly from Finland.
The trade union LO played an important role in the organization of labor recruitment
into Sweden, which prevented the undercutting of social standards. The LO put heavy
conditions on the recruitment of foreign workers and was even able to deny work permits
to companies that wanted to employ foreign workers but did not live up to the social
standards imposed by the LO. In Germany the guest worker programs were also highly
organized with the German Republic signing agreements with several countries in order
to facilitate labor migration. The main idea was that the guest workers would leave if
their employer did not need them anymore. The industrial relations in Germany were
built upon the compromise that trade unions should serve as forces for social integration.
There was a Keynesian compromise in which full employment was the goal of govern-
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ment policy that the trade unions signed up to. The trade unions were therefore in favor
of the labor recruitment programs and there were attempts to organize foreign workers
within the union. However, it was forbidden for non-Germans to run for positions in the
Works Council in the 1960s limiting the participation of foreign workers in trade union
structures. In Italy the fordist migration regime was characterized by emigration from the
country and by internal migration from the south to the north. The trade union move-
ment started o  united but then very rapidly disintegrated. The CGIL was the largest
and most influential trade union in Italy. A series of company agreements regulated the
industrial relations, together with state laws. The French migration regime during fordism
was marked by the recruitment of foreign workers and by (post) colonial ties. Illegalized
migration was part of the French migration regime from the very start. The trade union
landscape is marked by competing national confederations. The struggles of the labor
movement target the government and the state as well as employers. The CGTs posi-
tions towards immigrants during this period were mainly protectionist. The struggles and
movements of 1968 meant a radical change in the CGTs positions towards immigrants
and immigration.
After the end of the o cial recruitment of foreign workers in the beginning of the 1970s in
Western Europe, most immigration took place through family reunification and through
asylum. Illegalized immigration became a relevant part of immigration. The neoliberal
period meant a rhetoric and policy of “zero immigration” and for the trade unions this
period was mostly marked by a decline in membership and shift in the power relations of
society in favor of employers. In Sweden there was a rise in unemployment and a decline
in trade union power. The LO Sweden was still able to hold on to restrictive immigration
policies. However it was only in the 2000s that trade unions considerably lost influence.
By contrast, in Germany, the 1980s mark a sharp decline in the power and union mem-
bership of the DGB. A considerable number of workers were pushed to the margins of the
work force, which additionally reduced the regulatory e ect of the industrial relations.
The rise in racism and hate crimes in the 1980s and 1990s led the DGB and its a liates
to foster anti-racism campaigns. For Italy an important aspect of the neoliberal period
was the shift from being an emigration country to an immigration country. Additionally
the CGIL was marked by corruption scandals and by a phase of reorientation after the
disintegration of the Soviet Union. The CGIL called for more legal ways to immigrate
to Italy very early on in an attempt to struggle against illegalized immigration and the
employment forms that are linked to this type of immigration. The CGIL was active in
immigrant rights movements and in movements calling for the legalization of those with
residence and work permits. The CGT in France also saw its power and membership
decline. After the participation of the Communist Party in a coalition government the
CGT reoriented itself. Given that the main struggles of immigrants were focused on civil
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society during this period, the trade unions were marginalized within migrant movements.
A shift within the neoliberal migration regime, which took place in the four countries
at di erent points in the 2000s, also brought about a shift in the trade union’s approaches
and positions towards immigrants. There was a selective opening towards labor migrants
that I referred to as managed migration. The current surge of refugees that entered the
European Union has further shaped the migration regimes of the four countries I focused
on in this thesis. In Sweden a new law was passed in 2008, expanding labor migration.
This law was pushed though against the will of the LO Sweden since it considerably re-
duced its role in governing the immigration into the country. However, this law has also
produced a shift in the trade union’s position and approach towards migration. After
intense internal discussion the LO has abandoned its restrictive stance and has accepted
migration under certain circumstances. Currently the LO Sweden is advocating for the
labor market integration of the asylum seekers and refugees that are already in Sweden.
The opening up of an o ce for undocumented migrants surely indicates that the LO
Sweden is taking steps towards immigrants. The LO Sweden is facing o ensives by the
employers that have suggested suspending the minimum wage for refugees. In Germany
managed migration was implemented through a law that entered into force in 2005. The
DGB has had a contradictory position towards immigration. While the DGB supported
a ban on the freedom of movement for the new member states of the European Union in
2004, there have been examples of trade union organized and supported struggles with
immigrants. In the current situation the DGB proposes improvements for the labor mar-
ket integration of refugees. Similar to Sweden, the DGB is also faced by an o ensive of
the employers calling for the suspension of the minimum wage for refugees. In Italy the
Bossi Fini law introduced a form a managed migration to the country. The CGIL has a
tradition of struggling together with immigrants. The CGIL has front o ces that give
advice for issues concerning the regularization of work and residence permits. Similar to
France, an issue the trade union movement is facing is the large number of illegalized
workers. Some sectorial unions have even created structures within their unions for mi-
grants. Currently the CGIL actively supports refugees and asylum seekers by handing
out information and providing assistance. In France the Loi Hortefeux opened up more
possibilities for labor migration. This law enabled French employers to start a legaliza-
tion process for their employees in an irregular situation. The CGT organized two strike
movements aimed at employers and the state to legalize a large group of workers without
residence or work permits. This active organization of (illegalized) migrants marks a sig-
nificant shift in the CGTs attitude towards immigrants. A similarity of the trade unions
in all four countries is the engagement in anti-racist campaigns and movements. Given
that the far right is an active political force in all countries, the LO-Sweden, the DGB, the
CGIL and the CGT have made a point to struggle against racism, even in their own ranks.
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The trade unions attitudes and positions towards migrants in Sweden, Germany, France
and Italy have changed since the 2000s. All the trade unions analyzed in this thesis have
opened up and adopted a positive attitude towards migrants. However the extent to which
this positive shift has happened di ers greatly. This shift can be seen in the trade union
positions towards migrants in Germany and Sweden, which both abandoned their posi-
tions of sealing o  the labor market from immigrant workers. Both the LO Sweden and
the DGB have made attempts towards migrants by opening up front o ces for illegal-
ized immigrants and by engaging in punctual struggles. However there has not been a
nation-wide campaign for immigrant rights. In Italy and France the trade unions CGIL
and CGT are pro active when it comes to engaging in immigrant struggles. The CGIL has
a long history of being present in immigrant struggles and representing immigrants. The
CGT has organized a strike of illegalized immigrants, calling for their regularization. Both
provide assistance to refugees, asylum seekers, illegalized immigrants and other migrants.
82
Bibliography
ABDALLAH, M. H. J’y suis, j’y reste: les luttes de l’immigration en France depuis les
années soixante. [S.l.]: Reflex, 2000.
AIYAR, S.; BARKBU, B.; BATINI, N.; BERGER, H.; DETRAGIACHE, E.; DIZIOLI,
A.; EBEKE, C.; LIN, H.; KALTANI, L.; SOSA, S. et al. The refugee surge in Europe.
[S.l.], 2016.
AKRAP, D. Germany’s response to the refugee crisis is admirable. But I fear it cannot
last. 2015. Disponível em: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/06/
germany-refugee-crisis-syrian>.
AMBROSINI, M. Immigration in italy: Between economic acceptance and political
rejection. Journal of international migration and integration, v. 14, n. 1, p. 175–194,
2013.
ARRUZZA, C. Europe’s shame, The European Union fails refugees because
it is structured to serve the needs of capital beyond all. 2016. Disponível em:
<https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/04/eu-migrants-frontex-msf-syria-schengen/>.
AVENDAÑO, A.; ADLER, L. H.; TAPIA, M.; TURNER, L. Mobilizing against
inequality: Unions, immigrant workers, and the crisis of capitalism. [S.l.]: Cornell
University Press, 2014.
BARRON, P.; ANNE, B.; TOURETTE, L.; CHAUVIN, S.; JOUNIN, N. On bosse ici,
on reste ici!: La grève des sans-papiers: Une aventure inédite. [S.l.]: La Découverte, 2011.
BBC. Why is there a crisis in Calais? 2015. Disponível em: <http://www.bbc.com/
news/uk-29074736>.
BBC. Italy’s once untouchable minister. 2016. Disponível em: <http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-11981754>.
BENEDIKTER, R.; KAROLEWSKI, I. P. Italy’s migration crisis is a clear threat
to european unity. LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP), London School
of Economics and Political Science, 2017. Disponível em: <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
europpblog/2017/02/07/italy-migration-crisis-clear-threat-eu-unity/>.
BERGFELD, M. Germany’s willkommenskultur: Trade unions, refugees and labour
market integration. Global Labour Journal, v. 8, n. 1, 2017.
BJÖRG, F.; CERNA, L. Swedish Labour Immigration Policy: Role of Trade Unions,
Employers and Political Parties. 2015.
BOJADéIJEV, M. Die windige Internationale: Rassismus und Kämpfe der Migration.
[S.l.]: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2008.
BONFANTI, S. New rules for labour immigration: Delving into the 2008 swedish reform
of labour migration and its e ects on migrants’ well-being. Journal of International
Migration and Integration, Springer, v. 15, n. 3, p. 371–386, 2014.
83
BUCKEL, S. Welcome Management: Making Sense of the ”Sum-
mer of Migration”. 2016. Disponível em: <http://nearfuturesonline.org/
welcome-management-making-sense-of-the-summer-of-migration>.
BUCKEL, S.; GEORGI, F.; KANNANKULAM, J.; WISSEL, J. Theorie, methoden
und analysen kritischer europaforschung. Forschungsgruppe „Staatsprojekt Europa
“(Hrsg.), Kämpfe um Migrationspolitik. Theorie, Methode und Analysen kritischer
Europaforschung, p. 15–86, 2014.
BULMAN, M. French Government O ers Refugees and Migrants 2 500 to voluntary
deport themselves. 2016. Disponível em: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
europe/france-immigration-refugees-migrants-ofii-didier-leschi-a7439421.html>.
CAFRUNY, A. W.; RYNER, J. M. Monetary union and the transatlantic and social
dimensions of europe’s crisis. New Political Economy, v. 12, n. 2, p. 141–165, 2007.
CANDEIAS, M. Neoliberalismus–hochtechnologie–hegemonie. Grundrisse einer
transnationalen kapitalistischen Produktions-und Lebensweise. Eine Kritik, Hamburg,
p. 287, 2004.
CASTLES, S. Warum migrationspolitiken scheitern. Peripherie. Zeitschrift für Politik
und Ökonomie in der Dritten Welt, v. 25, n. 97/98, p. 10–34, 2005.
CASTLES, S. Guestworkers in europe: A resurrection? International migration review,
Wiley Online Library, v. 40, n. 4, p. 741–766, 2006.
CASTLES, S. International migration at a crossroads. Citizenship Studies, Taylor &
Francis, v. 18, n. 2, p. 190–207, 2014.
CATTANEO, C.; FIORIO, C. V.; PERI, G. What happens to the careers of european
workers when immigrants “take their jobs”? Journal of Human Resources, University of
Wisconsin Press, v. 50, n. 3, p. 655–693, 2015.
CGIL. Migranti: domani a manifestazione di Milano Cgil in prima fila. 2017. Disponível
em: <http://www.cgil.it/migranti-domani-manifestazione-milano-cgil-fila/#>.
CGT. LES MENSONGES DU FN SUR L’IMMIGRATION. 2017. Disponível em:
<http://www.cgt.fr/IMG/pdf/20170227_extremedroite_fiche_n7.pdf>.
CLEMENS, M. A.; PRITCHETT, L. The New Economic Case for Migration
Restrictions: An Assessment. [S.l.], 2016. Disponível em: <https://ideas.repec.org/p/
iza/izadps/dp9730.html>.
COLLETT, E. New EU Partnerships in North Africa: Potential to
Backfire? 2017. Disponível em: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/
new-eu-partnerships-north-africa-potential-backfire>.
COLLIER, P. Now is the Time to Slow Down Immigration. 2014.
Disponível em: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/nov/04/
slow-immigration-social-consequences>.
COLOMBO, A.; SCIORTINO, G. Italian immigration: the origins, nature and evolution
of italy’s migratory systems. Journal of Modern Italian Studies, Taylor &amp; Francis,
v. 9, n. 1, p. 49–70, 2004.
84
CROUCH, C. Das lange leben des neoliberalismus. Blätter für deutsche und internationale
Politik, v. 56, n. 11, p. 49–62, 2011.
DEMIROVI∆, A. Multiple krise, autoritäre demokratie und radikaldemokratische
erneuerung. Prokla, v. 171, n. 2, p. 193–215, 2013.
DEMIROVI∆, A.; SABLOWSKI, T. The Financedominated Regime of Accumulation
and the Crisis in Europe. [S.l.]: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, 2013.
DOCQUIER, F.; ÖZDEN, Ç.; PERI, G. The wage e ects of immigration and emigration.
[S.l.], 2010.
ENGLAND, C. Sweden sees record number of asylum seekers withdraw applications
and leave. 2016. Disponível em: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/
refugee-crisis-asylum-seekers-sweden-applications-withdrawn-record-numbers-a7209231.
html>.
European Council. Informal meeting of EU heads of state or government, Malta. 2017.
Disponível em: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2017/
02/03-informal-meeting/>.
European Union. Progress Report on the Partnership Framework with
third countries under the European Agenda on Migration. [S.l.], 2016.
Disponível em: <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/12301/
progress-report-partnership-framework-third-countries-under-european-agenda-migration_
en>.
Eurostat. Asylum statistics. 2017. Disponível em: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics>.
Eurostat. Migration and Migrant Population Statistic. 2017. Disponível em:
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_
migrant_population_statistics>.
FALCI, P. Securitization of migration policies in Italy. Tese (Doutorado) — uniwien,
2011.
FAZ. Wer Darf Kommen? 2004. Disponível em: <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/
politik/inland/das-einwanderungsgesetz-im-ueberblick-wer-darf-kommen-1178288.html?
printPagedArticle=true#pageIndex_2>.
FOGED, M.; PERI, G. Immigrants’ e ect on native workers: New analysis on
longitudinal data. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic
Association, v. 8, n. 2, p. 1–34, 2016.
FRÉMINVILLE, D. de. Petit Histoire de la CGT. 2015. Disponível em: <https:
//www.contrepoints.org/2015/10/14/225316-petite-histoire-de-la-cgt>.
FRIC, K.; AUMAYR-PINTAR, C. Approaches towards the labour market inte-
gration of refugees in the eu, eurofound, file. C:/Users/ACER/Desktop/eurofound-
approaches_towards_the_labour_market_ integration_of_refugees_in_the_eu-2016-
04-12. pdf, Eri im Tarihi, v. 4, p. 2016, 2016.
85
GEDDES, A.; SCHOLTEN, P. The politics of migration and immigration in Europe.
[S.l.]: Sage, 2017.
GEORGI, F.; HUKE, N.; WISSEL, J. Fachkräftemangel, lohndumping und puzzle-
politik. Kämpfe um Migrationspolitik. Theorie, Methode und Analysen kritischer
Europaforschung (Bielefeld: Transcript), p. 209–25, 2014.
GIANGRANDE, N. AS POSIÇÕES, AS PROPOSTAS E AS AÇÕES DA CGIL PARA
COMBATER O DESEMPREGO NA ITÁLIA (2004-2013). Dissertação (Mestrado) —
UNICAMP, 2016.
GORODZEISKY, A.; SEMYONOV, M. Not only competitive threat but also racial
prejudice: Sources of anti-immigrant attitudes in european societies. International
Journal of Public Opinion Research, Oxford University Press, v. 28, n. 3, p. 331–354,
2015.
HANSEN, R. Migration to europe since 1945: its history and its lessons. The Political
Quarterly, Wiley Online Library, v. 74, n. s1, p. 25–38, 2003.
HARZIG, C. A migrant is a migrant is a migrant? immigration policies in
post-world-war-ii europe. OAH Magazine of History, v. 14, n. 1, p. 22–25, 1999.
HESS, S.; KASPAREK, B.; KRON, S.; RODATZ, M.; SCHWERTL, M.; SONTOWSKI,
S. Der lange sommer der migration. Assoziation A, 2016.
HUYSMANS, J. The european union and the securitization of migration. JCMS: Journal
of Common Market Studies, Wiley Online Library, v. 38, n. 5, p. 751–777, 2000.
HYMAN, R. Understanding European trade unionism: between market, class and society.
[S.l.]: Sage, 2001.
JAUMOTTE, M. F.; KOLOSKOVA, K.; SAXENA, M. S. C. Impact of migration on
income levels in advanced economies. [S.l.], 2016.
KANNANKULAM, J. Kräfteverhältnisse in der bundesdeutschen migrationspolitik. die
asyldebatte als schlüsselereignis des schwerfälligen wandels vom gastarbeiterregime hin
zu managed migration in der bundesrepublik deutschland. Kämpfe um Migrationspolitik.
Theorie, Methode und Analysen kritischer Europaforschung (Bielefeld: Transcript), p.
93–112, 2014.
KARRAS, A.; MORINA, M. Trade union strategies for labor market integration of
refugee immigrants in Sweden. 2016.
KEYNES, J. M. Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: The General Theory and
After: Defence and D. [S.l.]: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
KEYNES, J. M. General theory of employment, interest and money. [S.l.]: Atlantic
Publishers & Dist, 2016.
KJELLBERG, A. The swedish ghent system and trade unions under pressure. Transfer:
European Review of Labour and Research, SAGE Publications Sage UK: London,
England, v. 15, n. 3-4, p. 481–504, 2009.
86
KOFMAN, E. Citizenship, migration and the reassertion of national identity. Citizenship
studies, Taylor & Francis, v. 9, n. 5, p. 453–467, 2005.
LAUBENTHAL, B. Der Kampf um Legalisierung: Soziale Bewegungen illegaler
Migranten in Frankreich, Spanien und der Schweiz. [S.l.]: Campus Verlag, 2006. v. 920.
LINDEN, M. van der. Workers of the world: Essays toward a global labor history. [S.l.]:
Brill, 2008. v. 1.
LÖW, N. Wir leben hier und wir bleiben hier! die Sans Papier im Kampf um ihre Rechte.
[S.l.]: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2013.
MANACORDA, M.; MANNING, A.; WADSWORTH, J. The impact of immigration
on the structure of wages: theory and evidence from britain. Journal of the European
Economic Association, Oxford University Press, v. 10, n. 1, p. 120–151, 2012.
MARINO, S.; PENNINX, R.; ROOSBLAD, J. Trade unions, immigration and
immigrants in europe revisited: Unions’ attitudes and actions under new conditions.
Comparative Migration Studies, Springer International Publishing, v. 3, n. 1, p. 1, 2015.
MARINO, S.; ROOSBLAD, J. Migration and trade unions. a comparison between dutch
and italian trade union actions and strategies. Transfer: European review of labour and
research, v. 14, n. 4, p. 625–638, 2008.
MEYERHÖFER, A.; HARTL, U.; LORENZ, D.; NEUMANN, S.; OESER, A. » dublin
ii kippen!«—kämpfe um selbstbestimmte migration in europa. Forschungsgruppe»
Staatsprojekt Europa «(Hg.): Kämpfe um Migrationspolitik—Theorie, Methode und
Analysen kritischer Europaforschung. Bielefeld, p. 151–167, 2014.
Migration Policy Institute. 2017. Disponível em: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/
regions/europe>.
MOORE, K. Swedish Government Struggling over Migration Crisis. 2016. Disponível
em: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35549169>.
NAMUTH, M. Trade Unions in Italy. [S.l.], 2013.
OECD. International Migration Outlook. [S.l.], 2016.
OECD. 2017. Disponível em: <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=UN_
DEN>.
O cial Website of Immigration to Sweden. 2017. Disponível em: <https://sweden.se/
migration/>.
PAPADEMETRIOU, D. G.; FRATZKE, S. Dawn of New Mi-
gration Reality Brings Focus on Borders, Returns and Integra-
tion. 2016. Disponível em: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/
top-10-2016-issue-1-dawn-new-migration-reality-brings-focus-borders-returns-and>.
PENNINX, R.; ROOSBLAD, J. Trade unions, immigration, and immigrants in Europe,
1960-1993: A comparative study of the attitudes and actions of trade unions in seven
West European countries. [S.l.]: Berghahn Books, 2002. v. 1.
87
PERNOT, J.-M. Die Gewerkschaften in Frankreich. [S.l.], 20210.
PICHL, M.; VESTER, K. Die verrechtlichung der südgrenze. menschenrechtspolitiken
im grenzraum am beispiel des hirsi-falls. Kämpfe um Migrationspolitik. Theorie, Methode
und Analyse kritischer Europaforschung. Forschungsgruppe „Staatsprojekt Europa “, Hg.
S, p. 187–206, 2014.
PISER, K. With the Jungle Closed in Calais, France’s Migrants Crisis Moves to
Paris. 2016. Disponível em: <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/20404/
with-the-jungle-closed-in-calais-france-s-migrant-crisis-moves-to-paris>.
POLIZER, M.; KASSIE, E. The 21st Century Gold Rush. 2016. Disponível em: <http://
highline.hu ngtonpost.com/articles/en/the-21st-century-gold-rush-refugees/#/italy>.
RANKIN, J. EU strikes deal with Turkey to send back refugees. 2016.
Disponível em: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/18/
eu-strikes-deal-with-turkey-to-send-back-refugees-from-greece>.
ROSENBERG, G. Sweden and its immigrants: policies versus opinions. Daedalus, p.
209–218, 1995.
RYNER, M.; CAFRUNY, A. The European Union and Global Capitalism: Origins,
Development and Crisis. [S.l.]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
SASSOON, D. One hundred years of socialism: The West European left in the twentieth
century. [S.l.]: IB Tauris, 2013.
SCHIERUP, C.-U.; ÅLUND, A. The end of swedish exceptionalism? citizenship,
neoliberalism and the politics of exclusion. Race & Class, v. 53, n. 1, p. 45–64, 2011.
SPARSCHUH, O. Citizens and non-citizens: The relevance of citizenship status in labour
migration within italy and to germany from the 1950s to 1970s. Journal of Contemporary
History, SAGE Publications Sage UK: London, England, v. 49, n. 1, p. 28–53, 2014.
TAZ. Taliban- Aussagen als Begründung. 2016. Disponível em: <http://www.taz.de/
!5292961/>.
The Economist. Hartz and minds. 2004. Disponível em: <http://www.economist.com/
node/3522141>.
TURNER, L. France. battles for inclusion, 1968–2010. In: Mobilizing Against Inequality:
Unions, Immigrant Workers, and the Crisis of Capitalism. [S.l.: s.n.], 2014. p. 69–85.
VASSILIS, T.; KARAKAYALI, S. Die regierung der migration in europa. jenseits von
inklusion und exklusion. Soziale Systeme, v. 14, n. 2, p. 329–348, 2008.
VERSECK, K. Flüchtlingspolitik in Urgarn, Abschottung to-
tal. 2017. Disponível em: <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/
victor-orban-schottet-ungarn-mit-neuen-gesetzen-gegen-fluechtlinge-ab-a-1137716.
html>.
World Bank. Immigration Policies Sweden and the United Kingdom. [S.l.], 2017.
